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Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer:
Analyzing the Cognitive Components
of the Analytical Mind
LARRY 0. NATT GANTT, II*
I. INTRODUCTION
"You come in here with a head full of mush and you leave thinking like a
lawyer. "1
Professor Kingsfield's declaration in the movie The Paper Chase
over thirty years ago still rings true as legal educators continue to seek
to train students to "think like lawyers."2 Despite the popularity of the
phrase, legal scholars have not agreed on a detailed conception of what
"thinking like a lawyer" means.' Does it mean the ability to analyze
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School of Law; M.Div., Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, 2000; J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1994; A.B., Duke University, 1991. I would like to thank Kim Pellini,
William Magee, and Andrew Ashby for their research assistance in writing this article.
I would also like to thank Regent University School of Law and the American Center
for Law and Justice for their funding of this research.
1. Nancy B. Rapoport, Is "Thinking Like a Lawyer" Really What We Want to Teach?,
1 J. Ass'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 91, 91 (2002) (quoting THE PAPER CHASE
(Twentieth Century Fox 1973)).
2. See, e.g., WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 12 (2002) ("The
purpose of legal education is to teach students 'how to think like lawyers."'); David T.
ButleRitchie, Situating "Thinking Like a Lawyer" Within Legal Pedagogy, 50 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 29, 29 (2002-03) ("The notion that a legal education is meant to convey to
students an idea of how to 'think like lawyers' is central to the modern legal
academy."); MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ, EXPERT LEARNING FOR LAW STUDENTS 203
(2005) ("Law professors almost universally refer to their task as teaching their
students to 'think like a lawyer' or teaching their students 'legal analysis."'); Jack
Chorowsky, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 463 (2003). Mr.
Chorowsky's brief essay is part of a symposium issue on Advice for Prospective Law
Students, and he offers only a short definition of "thinking like a lawyer." See
Chorowsky, supra, at 463-65. The phrase is so pervasive that even books geared to
nonlawyers encourage them to think like lawyers so that they can more effectively
negotiate the trials in everyday life. See Jamie Bufalino, What Lawyers Know That You
Wish You Knew, 0, THE OPRAH MAGAZINE, May 2004, at 89-90 (discussing the recent
book by Lis Wiehl Winning Every Time: How to Use the Skills of Lawyers in the Trials of
Your Life).
3. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 203 (observing that "many law professors
do not do a very good job defining for themselves or their students" what "thinking
like a lawyer" means); Eric A. DeGroff & Kathleen A. McKee, Learning Like Lawyers:
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primary legal materials and deduce how rules from those materials
apply to factual situations? Does it mean the ability to break down
complicated problems into nuggets of information that can be ordered
into a clear analytical framework? Does it mean the ability to see ambi-
guity in what most people think is clear? Does it mean all these
things?4
Numerous resources offer only general definitions of what it
means to "think like a lawyer."'5 In October 2002, the Journal of the
Association of Legal Writing Directors published several articles
addressing the issue: "Is 'Thinking Like a Lawyer' Really What We
Want to Teach?"6 Although the articles devote significant discussion to
the extent to which law schools should focus on training students to
think like lawyers, they fail to examine extensively what the phrase
Addressing the Differences in Law Student Learning Styles, 2006 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J.
499, 500 (2006) (observing that "[wihat it actually means to 'think like a lawyer'
remains ill-defined"). In their book on legal writing, Norman Brand and John White
contend that some individuals rely on "informed intuition" to help them solve legal
problems. NORMAN BRAND & JOHN 0. WHITE, LEGAL WRITING: THE STRATEGY OF
PERSUASION 135, 140 (2d ed. 1988). People relying on such intuition may be able to
solve such problems, but they may not be able to explain the specific thought
processes they used to solve the problems. Others are therefore still left wondering
what it means to "think like a lawyer."
4. Although "thinking like a lawyer" likely does include many cognitive processes,
a definition of "thinking like a lawyer" that is too broad is unhelpful. Stephen Burton
discusses the problem of overbreadth in highlighting the many issues a legal thinker
might consider before applying a statute. He concludes that, in trying to consider all
the issues, the legal thinker would "feel that [she] has been told to think about
everything before doing nothing. That is the formula to ensure that [she] does
nothing." STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 56 (2d
ed. 1995). Similarly, a description of the cognitive components of "thinking like a
lawyer" that includes "everything" provides would-be legal thinkers no specific
guidance to help them assess the suitability of their thought processes to solving legal
problems.
5. See, e.g., KENNEY F. HEGLAND, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND PRACTICE OF LAW
87-88 (2003) ("(1) To spot legal issues (problems) lurking in any fact pattern; (2) To
know the general solutions the law has adopted to solve these problems; and (3) To
apply these solutions to case at hand. This, and nothing more fancy is what it is 'to
think like a lawyer."').
6. Authors presented the papers during a panel at the 2001 Association of Legal
Writing Directors ("ALWD") Conference. The panel was entitled "Do Best Practices in
Legal Education Include an Obligation to the Legal Profession to Integrate Theory,
Skills, and Doctrine in the Law School Curriculum?" The papers are published in the
Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Directors. See 1 J. AsS'N LEGAL WRITING
DIRECTORS 91-129 (2002).
[Vol. 29:413
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means in the first place.7 In his article, Dean Scott Bice offers one of
the more detailed definitions of the term. He opines that the term
includes:
[T]he interpretation and use of legal materials (cases, statutes, admin-
istrative orders, private contracts, etc.) to serve clients' interests. Some-
times serving those interests involves using legal knowledge for
counseling, sometimes for negotiation, sometimes for lobbying for a
change in a relevant statute, sometimes for litigation. Moreover, in cer-
tain fora (an appellate court or a legislative body), "thinking like a law-
yer" requires normative arguments, which involve considerations of
such values as efficiency, corrective justice, and wealth distribution. 8
Dean Bice's definition, like many of the others, focuses on the practice
of law in conceptualizing what thinking like a lawyer means.
Definitions like this are unfulfilling. They are too context-specific
in assuming that individuals most think like lawyers when they are
representing clients, analyzing cases or statutes, or otherwise engaging
in traditional lawyering activities. In turn, these definitions tend to be
circular; they state that individuals are thinking like lawyers when they
are thinking through the tasks that most lawyers do. These definitions
do not go beyond the tasks of lawyers to consider what underlying
cognitive processes are involved when lawyers undertake these tasks.
In light of these definitions, legal scholarship would benefit from
an extended discussion of the cognitive components of the skill that
has become a central theme of legal education. Discussing these cog-
nitive components is additionally important because much has
changed over the last 15 years in how the legal academy views law
school pedagogy. Both the Association of American Law Schools and
the Society of Law Teachers have encouraged new and experienced law
teachers to try new teaching methods, 9 and legal educators have begun
to experiment with instructional models different than the traditional
case-driven, Socratic method.'0 What is unresolved is whether these
changes in law school instruction have changed the meaning of "think-
7. In his article, "Situating 'Thinking Like a Lawyer' Within Legal Pedagogy,"
David ButleRitchie argues that teaching law students how to "think like a lawyer" is an
integral link to initiating them into the legal world in modern American society.
ButleRitchie, supra note 2, at 31-32.
8. Scott H. Bice, Good Vision, Overstated Criticism, 1 J. Ass'N LEGAL WRITING
DIRECTORS 109, 109-10 (2002).
9. Rapoport, supra note 1, at 94 n. 10.
10. See Paula Lustbader, From Dreams to Reality: The Emerging Role of Law School
Academic Support Programs, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 839, 842-47 (1997) (recounting how law
school academic support programs have influenced law school faculty to use
nontraditional pedagogical methods).
20071 415
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ing like a lawyer." The traditional case-driven method, for instance,
certainly has affected the conception of how lawyers should think.
Now that the legal academy is changing, the question arises whether
the fundamental skills legal educators are teaching are changing.1
Similarly, as the practice of law changes, a related question arises as to
whether law school instruction in "thinking like a lawyer" should
change.
Discussing the meaning of the phrase is also important because
the advent of law school academic support programs has introduced to
the law school curriculum a new emphasis on teaching the skills that
make a successful law student and a successful lawyer. 2 Academic
support professionals often talk about teaching students how to think
like lawyers; 13 advancing a scholarly discussion on the concept would
aid these professionals in their work.
11. For instance, Harvard Law School recently adopted changes to its first-year
curriculum, and these changes include introducing a course entitled "Problems and
Theories," which will focus on problem solving, while introducing students to
theoretical frameworks illuminating legal doctrines and institutions. HLS Faculty
Unanimously Approves First-Year Curricular Reform, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
news/2006/10/06curriculum.php (last visited February 5, 2007); see also Sacha
Pfeiffer, Twas a Time for Change, THE BOSTON GLOBE, May 7, 2006, available at
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2006/05/07/twas-a-time forchange/
(last viewed May 11, 2006). The Boston Globe article notes how the proposal
recognizes a significant shift from the traditional case method and adds how other law
schools have adopted, or are considering, similar changes. Pfeiffer, supra.
12. See Leslie Yalof Garfield & Kelly Koenig Levi, Finding Success in the "Cauldron of
Competition": The Effectiveness of Academic Support Programs, 2004 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.
1 (2004); Richard Cabrera & Stephanie Zeman, Law School Academic Support Programs
- A Survey of Available Academic Support Programs for the New Century, 26 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 205 (2000) (describing survey of ABA approved law schools which
found over 90 percent of the 151 respondent schools reported having some type of
academic support program).
13. See, e.g., RUTA K. STROPUS & CHARLOTTE D. TAYLOR, BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN
COLLEGE AND LAW SCHOOL, STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS 16 (2001) (observing that law
school is designed to teach students how to "think like a lawyer"); HERBERT N. RAMY,
SUCCEEDING IN LAW SCHOOL 76 (2006) (discussing how law students should think like
lawyers as they take notes in class); SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 203. Professors
Stropus and Taylor both have worked in the area of law school academic support.
STROPUS & TAYLOR, supra, at xiii. Professor Ramy was the Director of the Academic
Support Program at Suffolk University Law School, RAMY, supra, at xv, and is now the
Director of the Academic Excellence Program at New England School of Law. See
http://www.nesl.edu/faculty/ramy.cfm (last visited September 5, 2006). Prof.
Schwartz is the Director of Ex-L, an academic support program at Washburn
University School of Law. See http://washburnlaw.edu/faculty/schwartz-michael.php
(last visited February 5, 2007).
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An increasing body of scholarship has begun to analyze the pro-
cess of legal reasoning, focusing on the cognitive elements of perceiv-
ing, organizing, and transforming new information into meaningful
concepts, and on the process of using information to form judgments
and solve problems. 14 However, scholars who have previously consid-
ered trying to define what it means to "think like a lawyer" have dis-
agreed over whether defining the phrase is even possible.' 5 Although
the phrase is undeniably multifaceted, trying to define it is critical
because it remains the phrase that is most commonly used to describe
the fundamental goal of law school education. 16
Moreover, some scholars have quibbled with the phrase "thinking
like a lawyer" because they assert that it connotes a thinking skill that
is unique to legal thinking and overlooks the fact that professionals in
other roles may use the same skills that are relevant to "thinking like a
14. See, e.g., DeGroff & McKee, supra note 3, at 517-48 (employing the Kolb
Learning Style Inventory ("KLSI") to correlate law students' learning styles with their
first-year grades, their scores on the Law School Admissions Test ("LSAT"), and other
variables); Vernelia R. Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, First Year Law Students
and Performance, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 63, 76 (1995-96) (employing the Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator ("MBTI") to identify "preferred patterns of mental functioning, such as
information processing, idea development, and judgment formation" among first-year
law students at the University of Dayton); Robin A. Boyle, Karen Russo & Rose
Frances Lefkowitz, Presenting a New Instructional Tool for Teaching Law-Related
Courses: A Contract Activity Package for Motivated and Independent Learners, 38 GONZ.
L. REV. 1 (2002-2003) (using the Productivity Environmental Preference Survey
("PEPS") to analyze the learning styles of law students at St. John's University); John H.
Reese & Tania H. Reese, Teaching Methods and Casebooks, 38 BRANDEIS L. J. 169 (2000)
(reporting a three-year learning style research project at the University of Denver using
the KLSI); John Sonsteng et al., Learning by Doing: Preparing Law Students for the
Practice of Law, The Legal Practicum, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 111 (1995) (discussing
a legal practicum implemented at William Mitchell School of Law with teaching
materials grounded largely on the "learning cycle" theories of David Kolb and Madelin
Hunter).
15. See STROPUS & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 16 n.28 (reasoning that "debate
abounds" as to the meaning of the phrase).
16. See id.; StephenJ. Friedman, Why Can't Law Students Be More Like Lawyers?, 37
TOL. L. REV. 81, 84 (2005) ("The classical paradigmatic relationship between legal
education and training to be a lawyer is simple: the most important function of law
school education is to teach its students to think like lawyers, and law firms will do the
rest."); JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASED METHOD IN AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS 24 (1914) ("[Tlhe real purpose of scientific instruction in
law is not to impart the content of the law, not to teach the law, but rather to arouse, to
strengthen, to carry to the highest possible pitch of perfection, a specifically legal
manner of thinking.").
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lawyer."17  Such criticisms correctly underscore that law teachers
should emphasize to students that "thinking like a lawyer" may not be
significantly different from the critical thinking and analytical skills
they developed in other disciplines.' 8 The criticisms, however, do not
detract from the worth of trying to define the phrase. As noted, law
students consistently hear that law school is not about learning the
law as much as it is about learning how to "think like a lawyer";' 9 the
legal academy therefore owes it to them to define this phrase that legal
educators continually use.
This article therefore tackles the task of identifying the cognitive
components of legal thinking. The article begins this task by discuss-
ing the development of modern law school pedagogy, which gave rise
to the emphasis on thinking like a lawyer. The article then considers
current conceptions of legal thinking which have divided the skill into
cognitive and practical components, and it examines why the cognitive
components remain at the center of the skill. The article then surveys
empirical research on legal thinking by examining recent research on
personality and learning styles as well as research on law student and
lawyer surveys. The article next analyzes the cognitive skills tested by
the paradigmatic examinations relevant to law school and lawyering,
the Law School Admissions Test ("LSAT") and the bar examination.
The article then draws upon these previous sections to delineate and
17. See Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like a Lawyer, 29
U.S.F. L. REV. 121, 185 (1994) (recounting how legal thinking relates to analytical
principles in various other disciplines).
18. Id. at 185; see also Leah M. Christensen, The Psychology Behind Case Briefing: A
Powerful Cognitive Schema, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 5, 19 (2006) ("Most of us would agree
that one of the tasks of law school is to teach students how to think like lawyers, but,
in truth, lawyers do not really think differently than anyone else."); cf. Drew L.
Kershen, Humanities and the First-Year Curriculum in Law School, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 790,
792-93 (1981) (observing that first-year law students often believe that legal education
is completely different from previous education they have received). Despite the
similarities between legal thinking and analytical reasoning in other contexts, legal
thinking does employ certain cognitive processes at a level different from how they are
used in other contexts. Michael Hunter Schwartz, for instance, advances that the skills
of legal reasoning and expressing legal reasoning in writing "require [students] to
combine and use knowledge in ways that, while similar to skills [students] already
possess, are unique." SCHWRnTZ, supra note 2, at 9. He adds, however, the students
who develop good legal reasoning skills can use those skills in various contexts,
regardless of whether they practice law. Id. at 18.
19. See Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 122-23 (citing Kenny Hegland,
Quibbles, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1491, 1516 (1989) ("We're not teaching you the law; we're
teaching you how to think like lawyers.") and David P. Bryden, What Do Law Students
Learn? A Pilot Study, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479, 479 (1984) (reasoning that teaching legal
thinking is more important than teaching legal rules)).
418 [Vol. 29:413
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discuss specific components of legal thinking. In this discussion, the
article references numerous resources that have analyzed the compo-
nents of legal thinking, and it examines the results of a survey on legal
thinking given to 250 law students at Regent University School of Law.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN LAW SCHOOL PEDAGOGY
Before defining the cognitive components of thinking like a law-
yer, it is important to analyze the origins of the concept. Scholars are
unsure when the phrase "thinking like a lawyer" first became popular,
but they consistently trace the origin of the concept to the 1870s when
Dean Christopher Langdell introduced the case method and Socratic
method at Harvard Law School. 20 Dean Langdell introduced this
approach because he believed that law is a science and that the scien-
tific method could be suited for use in legal education. 21 Through the
analysis of case precedent and the related use of the Socratic method
in the classroom, students were to learn analytical skills as well as the
rules of law.22
As the case method became ingrained in law school pedagogy,
critics challenged that the method failed to teach explicitly the analyti-
cal skills the method was designed to develop. 23 Critics observed that
20. See Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 127; Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl,
Tomorrow's Law Schools: Globalization and Legal Education, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137,
161 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's
Missing From the MacCrate Report - of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69
WASH. L. REV. 593 (1994); Frank J. Macchiarola, Lawyers in the Public Service and the
Role of Law Schools, 19 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 695 (1992). Prior to the 1870s, educators
viewed the practice of law to be an art, and they placed legal education in the larger
spectrum of the classical liberal arts. This view of law as art supported the position
that legal skills could be acquired by apprenticeship, the then dominant mode of
instruction in the law. Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 127 (citing, inter alia,
ROBERT STEVENS, Two CHEERS FOR 1870; THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL, in LAW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 405, 407-30 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971)).
21. See Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 128 (citing Christopher C. Langdell,
Teaching Law as a Science, 21 Am. L. REV. 123, 123 (1887) ("[Law is a science, and...
all the available materials of that science are contained in printed books.")). Legal
theorists prior to Langdell viewed the study of law to be a science, see HUHN, supra
note 2, at 8; but legal educators did not comprehensively incorporate this belief into
their instruction until the 1870s. See Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 127.
Langdell's particular approach to teaching law as science coincided with the growing
faith in empiricism and scientific inquiry that was occurring in the late nineteenth
century. Id. at 128 (citing JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW
MAKERS 200-61 (1950)).
22. See Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 128-29.
23. See, e.g., Paul F. Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case
Against the Case System?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167 (1986).
2007] 419
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this failure to focus on analytical skills, in part, led to students' focus-
ing on rule memorization over skills development.24 As Paul Wangerin
reasoned, "Most who teach substantive courses will . . . acknowledge
that dialectical skills should be a principal focus of their courses. For
the most part, however, such acknowledgements are mere lip service
to the idea. The overwhelming emphasis in most substantive courses
is on substance.
2 5
Indeed, law students often quickly learn that they have to "know
the rules" to succeed on their exams; and they, however misguided,
focus on learning those rules and fail to develop their skills in applying
those rules within an analytical framework.26 "Many students leave
law school still mystified because the skills involved in legal thinking
are never explicitly identified during the first year as a common thread
running through an integrated curriculum.
27
24. See, e.g., John B. Mitchell, Current Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking: A
Full Faculty Considers the Implications for Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 275, 288
(1989); Lewis D. Solomon, Perspectives on Curriculum Reform in Law Schools: A Critical
Assessment, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1992).
25. Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in "Legal Analysis": A Systematic Approach, 40
U. MiAMi L. REV. 409, 412-15 (1986). One of the changes since Langdell's time is the
prior educational training of most law students. As Saunders and Levine note,
students at Langdell's time "had an undergraduate liberal education in rhetoric, logic,
philosophy, science, and mathematics that served as a foundation for the case
method. The case method was intended to systematize teaching; subsequently,
however, the philosophical underpinnings have been gradually eroded and what has
been retained is simply the form." Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 183.
26. In my seven years of work in law school academic support, the most common
reaction I hear from students after they receive their first-semester grades is "But I
knew the law .... ." Their reaction underscores how they emphasized learning the
legal rules over learning the analytical approach necessary to succeed on law school
exams.
27. Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 131. Some schools have attempted to
address this shortcoming by increasing the degree of skills instruction in their
curricula, such as by developing their legal research and writing and their clinical
programs. See N. William Hines, Ten Major Changes in Legal Education Over the Past
25 Years, AALS NEWSLETTER, August & November 2005 (article continued from the
August to the November issue), available at http://www.aals.org/documents/aals
newsletter-aug05.pdf and http://www.aals.org/documents/aalsnewsletternov05.
pdf. Others have developed legal methods courses, which address analytical methods
over and above a traditional legal research and writing course. Critics, however, have
observed that these courses are promising but still suffer from certain shortcomings
that inhibit students' learning of fundamental analytical skills. Saunders & Levine,
supra note 17, at 131-32 (citing, inter alia, Leslie E. Gerwin & Paul M. Shupack, Karl
Llewellyn's Legal Method Course: Elements of Law and Its Teaching, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 64
(1983)). Saunders and Levine discuss other curricular changes, like interdisciplinary
approaches and collaborative learning, that law schools have adopted; but they reason
[Vol. 29:413420
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III. PRACTICAL AND COGNITIVE COMPONENTS OF LEGAL THINKING
In an attempt to define those skills, a task force of the ABA Section
on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar issued in 1992 a report
(the "MacCrate Report") that identified what it determined to be basic
lawyering skills and professional values that a student should have
developed by the time she is ready to represent her first client.28 These
basic skills and values include: (1) problem solving; (2) legal analysis
and reasoning; (3) legal research; (4) factual investigation; (5) commu-
nication; (6) counseling; (7) negotiation; (8) litigation and alternative
dispute resolution procedures; (9) organization of legal work; and (10)
recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas.2 9
From this list, scholars who have considered what it means to
"think like a lawyer" have distinguished between the practical skills
involved in this development and the analytical skills. 30 Specifically,
in their article on "thinking like a lawyer," Kurt Saunders and Linda
Levine observe, "Practical skills include legal research, oral and writ-
ten communication, counseling, negotiating, planning, and interview-
ing. Analytical skills involve fact analysis, case analysis and synthesis,
statutory analysis, argumentation, and critical evaluation of legal and
ethical issues.
3 1
Since the 1970s, legal education has experienced a tremendous
growth in the number of courses devoted to teaching law students
these practical skills, like legal research, oral advocacy, and negotia-
that "all such modifications somehow miss the mark because they tend to address
symptoms rather than the root causes of the problem." Id. at 131; cf. supra note 11
(discussing recent curricular changes at Harvard Law School).
28. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM:
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP
7-10 (1992) (THE "MACCRATE REPORT"). The MacCrate Report provided that its
objective was to:
seek[ ] to define the lawyering skills and professional values with which every
lawyer should be familiar prior to assuming the full responsibilities of a
member of the legal profession - i.e. prior to accepting the ultimate
responsibility for representing a client or, in those contexts in which a lawyer
acts without a client (such as situations in which a lawyer serves as an
advisor to a governmental agency or legislative committee), prior to accepting
the ultimate responsibility for making professional judgments or giving legal
advice.
Id.
29. Id. at 138-40.
30. Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 125.
31. id.
20071 421
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tions. 32 Law schools also instituted clinical programs in order to
enable students to apply their analytical skills in a real-life context.
33
Schools developed such programs, in part, because law firms and
other legal employers complained that law students enter the work
world inadequately trained in the practical skills needed to succeed in
law practice.34
Such instruction can effectively serve to teach law students partic-
ular skills that are important in many practice contexts. Saunders and
Levine therefore contend that the distinction between skills is artificial
given that legal problem solving involves both practical and analytical
aspects. 35 However, the distinction does have merit in that more fun-
damental cognitive and analytical thought processes lie at the heart of
the practical skills. For instance, the practical skill of legal research
necessarily involves analytical skills like statutory or case synthesis
and analysis, but the reverse is not true. Certain skills definitely serve
as the foundation for others.36 Law students cannot become effective
32. In a November 2005 article in the AALS Newsletter, N. William Hines, then
president of the AALS (the Association of American Law Schools) listed the increase in
professional skills training in law schools as the fourth most important change in legal
education in the last 25 years. See Hines, supra note 27, at 2 (November 2005). See
also Robert MacCrate, Symposium on the 21st Century Lawyer: Keynote Address- The
21st Century Lawyer: Is There a Gap to be Narrowed?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 517, 520
(1994) ("The growth of skills and values curriculum in law schools during the 1970s
is unquestionably the most significant development in legal education in the post-
World War II era.").
33. See, e.g., Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 130-31; MACCRATE REPORT,
supra note 28, at 520.
34. Cf. Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 131. Numerous scholars have
criticized these curricular changes as merely "ad hoc." E.g., id. at 130; STEVENS, supra
note 20, at 512-17 (describing curriculum as ad hoc); see also Keith A. Findley,
Rediscovering the Lawyer School: Curricular Reform in Wisconsin, 24 Wis. INT'L L.J. 295,
308-09 (2006) (discussing how clinical and skills-based programs are still not well
integrated into law schools' curricula and overall pedagogical approaches); Anita L.
Morse, Research, Writing, and Advocacy in the Law School Curriculum, 75 LAw LIBR. J.
232, 249 (1982) (calling curricular reforms "fragmented and put into place by
different constituencies ... to promote a particular interest rather than ... to create a
comprehensive model of legal education"); John H. Mudd, Academic Changes in Law
Schools, 29 GoNz. L. REV. 29, 31 (1994) (reasoning that such curricular changes are
made "without careful coordination or regard for their overall effect," which has
"caused others to criticize the resulting lack of curricular coherence"). Such criticism
of law school curricula is not new. See, e.g., ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC
PROFESSION OF THE LAW 252 (1921) (describing the law school curriculum as "a mere
aggregate or conglomerate of independently developed units").
35. Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 131.
36. See ButleRitchie, supra note 2, at 31-34 (contending that the cognitive aspects
of legal thinking are primary).
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lawyers solely by learning practical skills; students must first "think
like lawyers in order to act like lawyers."37
Discussing the relative import of practical and analytical skills
parallels the familiar debate between the role of theory/doctrine and
practice/application in legal education.3 8 The simple answer to the
debate is that law schools should do both. In their instruction of prac-
tice, however, law schools must be intentional in explaining the theory
behind the practice. Too often law students learn that they must think
critically and analytically without really knowing what such thinking
entails in the first place. Some legal scholarship has focused on the
analytical skills relevant to thinking like a lawyer because those skills
are more closely linked with the cognitive processes associated with
legal thinking.39 However, these analytical skills, at least as defined
above, are too context or doctrinal specific; and they fail to isolate the
basic cognitive thought processes that lie at the heart of legal thinking.
IV. PRIOR RESEARCH ON THE COGNITIVE ATTRIBUTES OF
LAW STUDENTS AND LAWYERS
In an effort to uncover attributes of legal thinking, scholars have
employed empirical methodologies to identify personality and cogni-
tive traits present in lawyers and law students. Although lawyers do
not think in ways that are categorically different from those in other
professions, research has confirmed that lawyers and law students do
tend to think in particular ways.4 ° Most extensively, scholars have
researched how lawyers score on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
("MBTI") versus the general population. These scholars have uni-
37. See Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 183. Definitions like Dean Bice's
focus on the practical skills and problematically limit thinking like a lawyer to what
lawyers often do. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Saunders & Levine,
supra note, at 130-31.
38. See Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 126 n.14 (discussing the debate).
39. See, e.g., id. at 125 (observing that analytical skills are considered more often
than practical skills as components to thinking like a lawyer because the analytical
skills are more directly tied with cognitive processes); ButleRitchie, supra note 2, at 31-
34 (analyzing the "narrow notion" of thinking like a lawyer, which focuses on the
cognitive aspects of the process).
40. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, The Lawyers' Philosophical Map and the Disputant's
Perceptual Map: Impediments to Facilitative Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 145, 155-56 (2001) (asserting that "[mlost lawyers ... approach the world in
an abstract, analytical way" and "are deemed so rational and analytical, in fact, that
'brain researchers have selected lawyers when they wished to test an occupational
group that is characteristically analytical in its preferred mode of thought"') (citations
omitted)).
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formly found that lawyers tend to be "thinkers," as opposed to "feel-
ers," at a greater rate than in the general population.4 '
More recently, scholars have researched the learning styles of law-
yers and law students to determine if they show an orientation for par-
ticular styles. One well-tested learning style assessment is the Kolb
Learning Style Inventory ("KLSI"). The KLSI posits that individuals in
the legal profession tend to possess an "assimilating" learning style.
The KLSI observes that "people with this learning style are best at
understanding a wide range of information."42 The KLSI adds that
people with this style "probably are less focused on people and more
interested in abstract ideas and concepts. Generally, people with this
learning style find it more important that a theory have logical sound-
ness than practical value. '43 Thus, although this style points primarily
to the way many lawyers absorb new information, it also explains what
lawyers do with new information once they absorb it, in that they
strive to "put[ ] it into concise, logical form. '4 4 Recent research on law
students has confirmed the KLSI position by finding that more stu-
41. Susan Daicoff, Articles Lawyer, Know Thyself. A Review of Empirical Research on
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1408 (1997)
(reporting that a disproportionately high percentage of lawyers and law students are
"thinkers" on the MBTI, as compared with the general population and with other
college students); Larry Richard, The Lawyer Types, 79 A.B.A. J. 74, 76 (1993)
(observing that 81 percent of male lawyers tested through use of the MBTI reported a
preference for "thinking" over "feeling," as did 66 percent of female lawyers tested);
Don Peters, Forever Jung: Psychological Type Theory, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and
Learning Negotiation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 17 (1993) (recounting that 80 percent of the
more than 600 University of Florida law students tested with the MBTI preferred a
"thinking" orientation). This orientation to "thinking" as opposed to "feeling" gives
rise to the issue of the place of emotion in legal thinking. Often argumentation in the
nonlegal arena appeals to the emotions of the arguers or the audience. To support
their position, debaters underscore how they "feel" about a particular position, or
similarly, how their audience should "feel" about the position. They are not
highlighting generalized accepted truths that support their positions but are instead
appealing to the emotional underpinnings of a particular argument. Lawyers, of
course, sometimes support their position by emotional appeals, particularly in trial
work before a jury. However, they rarely support their legal arguments by such
emotional appeals because, as L.H. LaRue highlights, they are to argue "from within
the rules." See infra notes 215-216 and accompanying text.
42. DAVID A. KOLB, THE KOLB LEARNING STYLE INVENTORY 7 (3d ed. 1999).
43. Id.
44. See id.
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dents tested have the assimilating learning style than any of the other
three KLSI learning styles.
4 5
The fact that lawyers tend to have this learning style does not
imply that lawyers should have this learning style. Research that
merely summarizes how lawyers learn and think is descriptive, not
normative. What is enlightening from a normative perspective, how-
ever, is whether this research coincides with surveys in which lawyers
and law students describe what they believe it means to "think like a
lawyer." Several scholars have conducted surveys of practicing lawyers
to determine their opinions on the relative importance of various skills
to law practice.46 A theme in these studies is that lawyers believe it is
important to be able to integrate factual and legal knowledge and to
exercise good judgment in working from that integrated understand-
ing.47 Reviewing these surveys highlights other skills that lawyers
deem important to effective lawyering.
Specifically, some of the studies underscore that lawyers believe
that the practical components of "thinking like a lawyer" are more
important than the cognitive components. For instance, a study of
young Chicago lawyers revealed that they believe that the most impor-
tant lawyering skills are "oral communication," "written communica-
tion," and "instilling others' confidence in you."48 After these skills, the
lawyers ranked the following cognitive components highly: "ability in
legal analysis and legal reasoning" (ranked fourth out of 17 skills) and
"ability to diagnose and plan solutions for legal problems" (ranked
sixth).49 In other surveys, lawyers actually ranked cognitive compo-
nents even more highly. For example, a study of Montana lawyers
found that they ranked "the trait of judgment" and "capacity to ana-
lyze" as most important.5 ° Similarly, in a survey of the alumni of six
"representative" law schools, participants stated that the "ability to
45. See DeGroff & McKee, supra note 3, at 520-21 (finding that 45 percent of the
respondents reflected a preference for the assimilating style after surveying 177
incoming students at Regent University School of Law).
46. See Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science,
and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 326 (1995) (describing surveys).
47. See id.
48. Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of
Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 473 (1993).
49. See id. "Drafting legal documents" ranked fifth in terms of importance. Id.
Interestingly, "knowledge of substantive law" ranked seventh behind these other skills.
Id.
50. John 0. Mudd & John W. LaTrielle, Professional Competence: A Study of New
Lawyers, 49 MONT. L. REV. 11, 18 (1988).
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analyze and synthesize law/facts" was the most important skill.5 '
Other studies have found an emphasis in cognitive skills relating to the
facts of a legal problem. For instance, a different study of Chicago
lawyers found that practitioners ranked as most important the skills of
"fact gathering" and the "capacity to marshal facts and order them so
that concepts can be applied. '5 2 A survey of California lawyers simi-
larly found that the skills ranked most highly by the lawyers were "ana-
lyzing cases/legal research" and "investigating the facts of client's
case."
53
In a survey more recent than those above, Professors Marjorie
Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck at the University of California, Berkeley
surveyed from 2001 to 2003 over 2000 individuals, including Boalt
Hall alumni, students, faculty, affiliated judges, and clients of Boalt
lawyers.54 They asked these individuals to list the personal skills that
make someone an effective lawyer. 55 They used the responses to gen-
erate a list of 26 factors, which they, in turn, are using to develop an
alternative law school entrance test that can assess those factors. Sur-
vey respondents reported that both cognitive and practical skills were
important; and similar to the older surveys, certain cognitive compo-
nents, such as "analysis and reasoning" and "problem solving,"
remained central.5 6 "Fact finding," which involves a mix of cognitive
and practical skills and appeared in other surveys, also appeared on
the list. However, different cognitive factors were reported as relevant
to effective lawyering. Specifically, respondents listed "practical judg-
ment," "creativity/innovation," and "ab[ility] to see the world through
the eyes of others" as important skills. 57
Finally, although law students are not yet practicing lawyers,
insight into how successful law students think is helpful in determin-
51. Leonard L. Baird, A Survey of the Relevance of Legal Training to Law School
Graduates, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 264, 273 (1978).
52. FRANCES KAHN ZEMAS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC
PROFESSION 123-25 (1981).
53. Robert A. D. Schwartz, The Relative Importance of Skills Used by Attorneys, 3
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 321, 325 (1973).
54. See electronic mail from Prof. Shultz to the author, January 18, 2007; see also
Linley Erin Hall, What Makes for Good Lawyering? A Multi-Year Study Looks Beyond the
LSAT, TRANSCRIPT, Summer 2005, at 22, 23 (discussing the project).
55. See 26 Effectiveness Factors, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/beyondlsat/
effectiveness.pdf (last visited January 17, 2007); see also Hall, supra note 54, at 23-24.
56. Id. Profs. Shultz and Zedeck did not rank the 26 factors. See electronic mail
from Prof. Shultz to the author, January 18, 2007.
57. 26 Effectiveness Factors, supra note 55. The list includes other factors, like
"developing relationships," that do not directly relate to the cognitive components of
legal thinking.
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ing what it means to "think like a lawyer" because legal instruction is
designed to develop that cognitive skill.5 8 In 1999 and 2000, the Law
School Admission Council ("LSAC") surveyed 3,525 respondents
(3,048 students and 457 faculty) from 41 law schools to determine
"what academic tasks are fundamental to success in law school
courses" (the "LSAC Study"). 5' To answer this question, the LSAC
asked the respondents to judge the importance of specific tasks in law
school courses. The respondents rated 57 tasks in 14 skill-related cat-
egories on a scale of 1-4, with 4 being "highly important" and 1 being
"not important/not applicable.16 0
Respondents answered that the following tasks were most
important:
All seven tasks associated with "Analyzing Cases or Legal
Problem":
* identifying key legal facts and issues (3.6),
* identifying a principle or rule of law operating in a case (3.6),
applying a case, rule or legal statute to a hypothetical case (3.6),
* identifying the basis for a legal decision (3.5),
* interpreting statutes in relation to a case or problem (3.5),
* identifying and evaluating the legal arguments in a case (3.4), and
* identifying similarities and differences between cases and problems
(3.4)
Two of the ten Writing tasks:
* writing concisely and with clarity (3.5), and
* arguing logically and persuasively (3.4)
Two of the four Reasoning tasks:
* deducing a legal conclusion (3.5), and
* generalizing or synthesizing rules from cases (3.4)
One of two Problem Solving tasks:
* identifying a legal problem and the legal issues involved (3.6)
One of five Reading tasks:
* reading assigned materials (3.5)
One of four Listening tasks
58. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
59. Stephen W. Luebke, et al., Final Report: LSAC Skills Analysis Law School Task
Survey 1 (Law School Admission Council Computerized Testing Report 02-02, May
2003), http://members.lsacnet.org/ [hereinafter LSAC Study].
60. Id.
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• identifying the key in lectures and discussions (3.4).61
Several of these skills, like the reading and writing tasks, pertain to
practical skills. Other skills, however, relate to analytical processes,
such as the reasoning tasks and many of the case analysis tasks. This
survey thus provides insight into the critical cognitive components of
what it means to think like a lawyer.6 2
V. THINKING SKILLS MEASURED BY THE LSAT AND BAR EXAMINATIONS
An additional source to identify the skills relevant to thinking like
a lawyer are the examinations that serve as rites of the passage into law
school and into the practice of law, the LSAT and the bar examination.
A. Skills Measured by the LSAT
Despite its critics, the LSAT remains a statistically significant pre-
dictor of law school grades63 and bar passage. 64 The LSAC, which
designs and administers the test, states that the LSAT "provides a stan-
dard measure of acquired reading and verbal reasoning skills that law
schools can use as one of several factors in assessing applicants. 65
61. Id. at 11-12. It is noteworthy that, despite popular conceptions of what lawyers
and law students do, communicating orally was not ranked as highly as these other
tasks. See id. at 12-13.
62. Relating the analytical skills important to law school success to the analytical
skills important to thinking like a lawyer raises the question of whether law school
adequately prepares students for the cognitive skills necessary for effective lawyering.
Stephen Friedman and other critics have contended that law schools are not
succeeding in this regard. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 82-84. Even critics like
Friedman, however, contend that the analytical skills important to law school success
make up at least some of the analytical skills important to thinking like a lawyer. See
id. at 84. This article thus assumes that such law school skills represent some of the
skills important to legal thinking generally.
63. See, e.g., Linda F. Wightman, Beyond FYA: Analysis of the Utility of LSAT Scores
and UGPA for Predicting Academic Success in Law School, Law School Admission
Council Research Report 99-05 at 3 (2000) (reporting that research studies and LSAC
Correlation Studies have found law students' LSAT scores to be correlated positively
with their first-year grades).
64. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, LSAC NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL BAR PASSAGE
STUDY (2004) [hereinafter BAR PASSAGE STUDY] (reporting that both law school grade-
point average and LSAT score were "the strongest predictors of bar examination
passage for all groups studied").
65. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION REFERENCE MANUAL
2006-07 at 7 (2006) [hereinafter LSAC REFERENCE MANUAL]. The American Bar
Association ("ABA") does not obligate ABA-accredited schools to require their
applicants to complete the LSAT prior to admission. Standard 503 of the ABA's
Standards for Approval of Law Schools provides, "A law school shall require each
applicant for admission as a first year J.D. student to take a valid and reliable
428 [Vol. 29:413
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LSAC adds specifically that the test is designed to "measure skills that
are essential for success in law school," and it identifies the following
relevant skills:
1) "the reading and comprehension of complex texts with accuracy
and insight;"
2) "the organization and management of information and the ability to
draw reasonable inferences from it;"
3) "the ability to think critically;" and
4) "the analysis and evaluation of the reasoning and arguments of
others."66
To assess these skills, the test measures:
1) reading comprehension, including the ability "to read carefully and
accurately, to determine the relationships among various parts of
the reading selection, and to draw reasonable inferences from the
material in the selection";
2) analytical reasoning, including the ability "to understand a struc-
ture of relationships and to draw logical conclusions about the
structure"; and
3) logical reasoning, including the ability "to understand, analyze, crit-
icize, and complete a variety of arguments, 67
Scholars have reasoned that these skills measured by the LSAT
"capture the essence what it means to do legal analysis or to 'think like
a lawyer.'" 68  More specifically, these skills reflect an orientation for
the cognitive components to legal thinking as opposed to the practical
components. Such an orientation may simply be a function of the fact
that the cognitive components are easier to test in a standardized fash-
admission test to assist the school and the applicant in assessing the applicant's
capability of satisfactorily completing the school's educational program." AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, STANDARDS
FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 503 (2006-07). Interpretation 503-1 adds,
"A law school that uses an admission test other than the Law School Admission Test
sponsored by the Law School Admission Council shall establish that such other test is
a valid and reliable test to assist the school in assessing an applicant's capability to
satisfactorily complete the school's educational program." Id. at Interpretation 503-1.
66. LSAC REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 65, at 7.
67. LAX, SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, 2007-2008 LSAT & LSDAS INFORMATION
BOOK 27, 40, 49 (2007), available at http://www.lsac.org/pdfs/2007-2008/Infobook
text2007web.pdf. Beginning with the test in June 2007, the LSAT will introduce a new
question type in the reading comprehension section. This new type will require
students to read two short passages and answer questions about the passages,
primarily questions about how they relate to each other. See id. at 28.
68. DeGroff & McKee, supra note 3, at 504; see also Marjorie M. Shultz, Expanding
the Definition of Merit, TRANSCRIPT, Summer 2005, at 25, 26 (stating that the cognitive
skills tested on the LSAT are important to "being a good lawyer").
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ion.6 9 However, if the focus were due only to ease of testing, the corre-
lation between LSAT scores and first-year grades would not be
significant unless law schools similarly focus on such cognitive skills,
at least in the first year. Therefore, the LSAT's orientation towards cog-
nitive components likely does point to a similar emphasis in legal rea-
soning as evaluated in the law school context.7 °
B. Skills Tested by Bar Examinations
The LSAT's orientation to the cognitive components would not be
relevant to how lawyers, as opposed to law students, think were it not
for the fact that LSAT scores positively correlate with bar passage.7'
Thus, although the LSAT is purportedly the test to measure "skills that
are essential to law school,"72 bar examinations likely test similar skills
because such skills are important to lawyering.73
The format of the bar exam varies from state to state, but all but
two states test applicants on one day using the Multistate Bar Examina-
tion (MBE), which is designed by the National Conference of Bar
Examiners (National Conference or NCBE).74 On the second day,
those states use a state-specific examination format often consisting
mostly of essay questions. A growing number of states also use at
least a portion of one or both of the other tests designed by the
69. See Susan Case, Presentation entitled "Framing the Issues" at the National
Conference of Bar Examiners Academic Support Conference (Aug. 29, 2006).
70. Some scholars contend that the LSAT concentrates inappropriately on cognitive
skills. For instance, as discussed above, Marjorie Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck are
developing a law school entrance examination that will serve as an alternative to the
LSAT. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. In their test, they seek to
evaluate applicants' abilities along 26 factors that include more than cognitive skills.
See id. See also Shultz, supra note 68, at 26.
71. See BAR PASSAGE STUDY, supra note 64 and accompanying text. This assertion
assumes that the current format of bar exam accurately measures applicants'
preparedness to practice law. Fully discussing this assumption is outside the scope of
this article, but many scholars have written extensively on how they disagree with the
assumption. See, e.g., Kristen Booth Glen, Thinking Out of the Bar Exam Box: A
Proposal to "MacCrate" Entry to the Profession, 23 PACE L. REV. 343 (2003).
72. LSAC REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 65, at 7.
73. Cf. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, THE MBE 2007 INFORMATION
BOOKLET 2 (2006) available at http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mbe (last visited
Feb. 22, 2007) ("The MBE is but one of a number of measures that a board of bar
examiners may use in determining competence to practice law.").
74. The District of Columbia also uses the MBE. The two states that do not use the
MBE are Louisiana and Washington. See The National Conference of Bar Examiners,
Jurisdictions Using the MBE in 2005, http://www.ncbex.org/fileadmin/mediafiles/
downloads/Bar -Admissions/2005stats.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
National Conference of Bar Examiners, 2005 Statistics].
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National Conference, the Multistate Essay Exam (MEE) and the Multis-
tate Performance Test (MPT).75
1. The National Bar Examinations
Given the prevalence of these national tests, particularly the MBE,
assessing what those tests measure may provide insight into the cogni-
tive skills necessary to think like a lawyer. The MBE is an objective,
six-hour examination containing 200 multiple-choice questions in the
following areas: Constitutional Law, Contracts, Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure, Evidence, Real Property, and Torts.76 The emphasis of the
exam is primarily on the applicant's substantive knowledge in the
topic areas tested.77 However, the National Conference states that the
questions often assess more than the applicant's substantive knowl-
edge of the law: "Many of the questions require applicants to analyze
the legal relationships arising from a fact situation or to take a position
as an advocate. Some questions call for suggestions about interpreting,
drafting, or counseling that might lead to more effective structuring of
a transaction." '78 The first sentence of this description, like the
description of the LSAT, points to the cognitive components relevant to
the skill of legal thinking.79 The phrase "analyze the legal relation-
ships arising from a fact situation" emphasizes that legal thinking
75. The National Conference also designs the Multistate Professional
Responsibility Exam (MPRE), but this exam is not customarily considered part of the
bar examination because applicants can take it at times separate from when they take
the other components. Including D.C., the following states use at least a portion of the
MEE: Alabama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,' Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia. See The National Conference of Bar Examiners,
2005 Statistics, supra note 73 (including data through 2006). Including D.C., the
following states use at least a portion of the MPT: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. See id.
76. The National Conference of Bar Examiners, Description of the MBE, http://
www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mbe/mbe-faqs/description (last visited Sept. 6,
2006).
77. See id. ("The questions on the examination are designed to be answered by
applying fundamental legal principles rather than local case or statutory law. A given
question may indicate the applicable statute, theory of liability, or comparable
principle of law.").
78. Id.
79. The second sentence points to the practical components to legal thinking. The
fact that the National Conference tests such components does not undercut the
importance of the cognitive components; it just affirms Saunders and Levine's
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involves finding a nexus between facts in a situation and the relevant
legal rules.
In describing the MEE, the National Conference states:
The purpose of the MEE is to test the applicant's ability to: identify
legal issues raised by a hypothetical factual situation; separate material
which is relevant from that which is not; present a reasoned analysis of
the relevant issues in a clear, concise, and well organized composition;
and demonstrate an understanding of the fundamental legal principles
relevant to the probable solution of the issues raised by the factual situ-
ation .... The primary distinction between the MEE and the MBE is
that the MEE requires the applicant to demonstrate an ability to com-
municate in writing effectively.80
Although the National Conference reasons that the primary dis-
tinction involves the written format, the nature of the essay questions
on the MEE enables the test to assess cognitive skills in addition to
those tested on the MBE. First, applicants must identify the legal
issues and separate relevant from irrelevant information.8 MBE ques-
tions are more directed than those in the MEE because the "call" or
"stem" of the MBE questions are more specific.82 Thus, in light of the
MEE's emphasis on issue identification and relevance assessment, cull-
ing through a factual scenario to discover legal issues and assess rele-
vance must be important lawyering skills.
supposition that successful lawyering involves more than cognitive skills. See
Saunders and Levine, supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
80. The National Conference of Bar Examiners, Description of the MEE, http://
www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mee/mee-faqs/description-of-the-mee (last visited
Sept. 6, 2006). The National Conference also develops the MPT, in which applicants
review a hypothetical case file and then complete based on the file a lawyering task,
such as a memorandum to the supervising partner. The National Conference provides
that the MPT requires applicants to "(1) sort detailed factual materials and separate
relevant from irrelevant facts; (2) analyze statutory, case, and administrative materials
for relevant principles of law; (3) apply the relevant law to the relevant facts in a
manner likely to resolve a client's problem; (4) identify and resolve ethical dilemmas,
when present; (5) communicate effectively in writing; (6) complete a lawyering task
within time constraints." The National Conference of Bar Examiners, Description of
the MPT, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpt/mpt-faqs/descriptionl (last
visited Sept. 6, 2006). The national bar review service, BAR/BRI, provides on its
website that the MPT tests applicants' "ability to 'think like a lawyer."' BAR/BRI Bar
Review, available at http://www.barbri.com/app.aspx?cmd=beiSubjectsTested&state=
NY (last visited April 13, 2007).
81. Description of the MEE, supra note 80.
82. See STEVEN R. FINZ, THE FINZ MULTISTATE METHOD 3 (2003) (providing a
diagram of a typical MBE question which shows the "stem" or "call" of the question).
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2. The State Bar Examinations
Although nearly all states, including the District of Columbia
(D.C.), provide a list of doctrinal subjects their bar examinations
test,8 3 a review of materials disseminated by all states and D.C. reveals
that thirty states and D.C. do not address what particular analytical
skills the state-specific portions of their examinations are intended to
measure.84 Those states either do not address what skills are relevant
to their examination or only refer to skills tested on the national tests
those states use, like the MBE, MEE, and the MPT.85
The remaining twenty states provide some insight into the skills
tested on their state bar examinations. Most of these states discuss
those skills in the context of describing how the bar examiners evalu-
ate applicants' essay answers. A review of the information provided by
these twenty states shows that many of them describe similarly the
types of skills they assess. In sum, these patterns point to particular
cognitive skills that state bar examiners evidently conclude are impor-
tant to the practice of law.
First, the states nearly uniformly highlight that the applicants
must discern relevant from irrelevant material to identify the legal
issues.8 6 Some of these states more specifically provide that applicants
must analyze and discern the relevant facts in the question.87 Second,
83. See BAR/BRI Bar Review, http://www.barbri.com (providing information on
the bar examinations of all fifty states and D.C., including information on what
subjects are tested) (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
84. This review was based on an analysis of each state's website on its respective
bar exam. If a state did not have a relevant website, the state was contacted by phone
to obtain any pertinent information.
85. See, e.g., Texas Board of Law Examiners, Texas Bar Examination General
Instructions, http://www.ble.state.tx.us/exam-info/tbe-instructions2.htm (last visited
Sept. 6, 2006) (discussing only the skills relevant to the MPT); Commonwealth of
Massachusetts Board of Bar Examiners, Information Relating to the Admission of
Attorneys in Massachusetts, http://www.mass.gov/bbe/barapprulesaug2002.pdf (last
visited Sept. 6, 2006) (not providing any state specific information but linking
potential applicants to the National Conference website for information on the
national tests).
86. See, e.g., The State Bar of California, Description of the California Bar
Examination: General Bar Examination and Attorney's Examination, http://calbar.ca.
gov/calbar/pdfs/admissions/ex1020900.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
87. See, e.g., Alaska Bar Association, Instructions to Alaska Bar Exam Applicants,
http://www.alaskabar.org/index.cfm?ID=4990 (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) ("Answers to
essay questions are expected to demonstrate the ability to analyze the facts presented
by the questions, to select the material facts, to discern the points upon which the case
turns, and to present the response in a logical, well-organized, literate manner."); State
Board of Law Examiners, Grading the Maryland Bar Examination, http://www.courts.
state.md.us/ble/examgrading.html#Passing%20Criteria/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2006)
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many states emphasize that applicants must demonstrate good "logic"
and "analysis" and good "reasoning" ability.8" Two of these states
("Assignment of a raw score to an Essay answer will be evaluated on the basis of how
well the examinee: Demonstrates an understanding of the significance of relevant and
material facts; Applies legal principles to the relevant and material facts; and
Articulates appropriate reasoning for reaching conclusions which respond to the
question."). In an interview of three state bar examiners at a conference sponsored by
the NCBE, all three emphasized that thinking like a lawyer, as tested on their bar
examinations, requires applicants to discern the relevant from the irrelevant facts in a
given scenario. Interview with Margaret Fuller Corneille, Director, Minnesota Board of
Bar Examiners, Eleanor Mitchell Hunter, Executive Director, Florida Board of Bar
Examiners, and Diane Bosse, Member, New York Board of Bar Examiners at the NCBE
Academic Support Conference (Aug. 30, 2006).
88. See, e.g., Alabama Bar, Rules Governing Admission to Alabama State Bar, http://
www.alabar.org/public/admissions/RulesAdmissions2003.pdf (last visited Sept. 6,
2006) ("Essay examination and performance-test questions will test the applicant's
ability to reason logically, to analyze legal problems accurately, to demonstrate a
knowledge of the fundamental principles of law, to be able to apply those principles,
and to perform basic legal tasks."); Arkansas Judiciary, Arkansas Bar
Examination Arkansas Essay Questions and Top Examination Papers, http://courts.state.
ar.us/courts/ble-exam-essay.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) (noting that the essay
answers are considered at the top of the pool are based on various factors including
the "perceived writing, analytical, and reasoning ability, as well as knowledge of the
law"); Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admission
to the Bar, http://www.floridabarexam.org/ (follow "Rules" hyperlink) (last visited
Sept. 6, 2006) ("The General Bar Examination shall test the applicant's ability to
reason logically, to analyze accurately the problem presented, and to demonstrate a
thorough knowledge of the fundamental principles of law and their application.");
Idaho State Bar & Idaho Law Foundation, Inc., Bar Examination Grading Standards &
Procedures, http://www2.state.id.us/isb/PDF/Grading%20Standards.pdf (last visited
Sept. 6, 2006) ("The Bar examination should test the applicant's ability to reason
logically, to analyze accurately, the problems presented to him and to demonstrate
thorough knowledge of the fundamental principles of law and their applications. The
examination should not be designed primarily for the purpose of testing information,
memory, or experience." (quoting National Conference of Bar Examiners: Canon 16,
Bar examination Grading Standards and Procedures)); Kentucky Office of Bar
Admissions, http://www.kyoba.org/apps%20and%20forms/applications/bar%20
exam/exam%20information.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) ("When taking the essay
portion of the exam, please note that the value of an answer depends not so much
upon the correctness of the conclusion(s) as upon the recognition of issues and the
quality of the discussion that evidences an ability to apply the law to the facts
presented and to reason in a logical manner in arriving at a conclusion."); Minnesota
State Board of Law Examiners, Rules for Admission to the Bar, http://www.ble.state.
mn.us/rules.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) ("Applicants must meet the following
essential eligibility requirements for the practice of law: (1) The ability to reason,
recall complex factual information and integrate that information with complex legal
theories .... ); The Mississippi Supreme Court, Rules Governing the Admission to the
Bar, http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/rules/RuleText.asp?RuleTitle=RULE+IX%2E+
434
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EXAMINATION&IDNum=10 (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) ("Essay and performance test
questions will test the applicant's ability to reason logically, to analyze accurately legal
problems, and to demonstrate a knowledge of the fundamental principles of law and
their application, and to perform basic legal tasks."); Missouri Board of Law
Examiners, FAQ About Admission, http://www.courts.mo.gov/SUP/index.nsf/481524
08327899bc8625673500728856/22ecdec6 1d35de8186256d9800505963?Open
Document (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) ("The examination does not seek a recitation of
legal rules by rote, but rather a demonstration of knowledge of legal principles and the
ability to think and reason by applying those principles to the facts so as to come to a
logical and coherent conclusion."); Nebraska State Bar Commission, Admission of
Attorneys, http://supremecourt.ne.gov/rules/pdf/attyadm-02.pdf (last visited Apr. 13,
2007) ("In addition to the admission requirements otherwise established by these
rules, the essential eligibility requirements for admission to the practice of law in
Nebraska are . . . (e) The ability to reason, analyze, and recall complex factual
information and to integrate such information with complex legal theories. ... );
State Bar of Nevada, Information Regarding the Bar Examination for the State Bar of
Nevada, http://www.nvbar.org/PDF/Requirements%/o20Memo.pdf (last visited Sept. 6,
2006) ("The [Nevada] Performance Test question(s) may test applicants on their
knowledge of the following skills: problem solving, legal analysis and reasoning,
factual analysis, communication, organization and management of a legal task, and
recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas."); New York State of Bar Examiners, The
Bar Examination, http://www.nybarexam.org/barexam.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2006)
("Each essay question is designed to test the applicant's ability to analyze a given set of
facts, to identify the issues involved and the applicable principles of law, and to reason
therefrom to a sound conclusion."); Oregon State Bar, Answers to Questions about the
Bar Admissions Process, http://www.osbar.org/_docs/admissions/06Q&A.pdf (last
visited Apr. 13, 2007) ("The examination does not seek a recitation of legal rules by
rote, but rather a demonstration of knowledge of legal principles and the ability to
think and reason by applying those principles to the facts, so as to come to a logical
and coherent conclusion."); Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners, Passing Standards,
http://www.pabarexam.org/BarExamination/Passing-Standards.htm (last visited
Sept. 6, 2006) ("Please note that the value of an essay answer depends ... upon the
recognition of issues and the quality of the discussion that evidences an ability to
apply the law to the facts presented, and to reason in a logical manner in arriving at a
conclusion."); The Board of Bar Examiners, BBE Rules and Regulations, http://www.
vermontjudiciary.org/BBE/bbelibrary/bberulesregs.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2007)
("Applicants for admission must demonstrate the minimal professional competence
necessary to engage in the practice of law including but not limited to: (1) knowledge
of the statutory and common law, (2) capacity to analyze factual situations and apply
principles of law to them, and (3) facility for written expression."); Rules for
Admission to The Practice of Law in West Virginia, Rule 3.2, West Virginia Bar
Examination, http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/Bd%20of%2OLaw/lawprac.htm#Rule%
203.2.%2OWest%20Virginia%2OBar%20Examination (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) ("The
purposes of the West Virginia Bar Examination are to test the applicant's ability to
reason logically, to analyze accurately the problems presented, to demonstrate a
thorough knowledge of the fundamental principles of law and their application . . .");
cf. New Jersey Board of Bar Examiners, Suggestions on Answering Essay Questions,
http://www.njbarexams.org/barbook/aic5.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) ("The essay
portion of the bar examination is designed to test your ability to demonstrate a basic
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underscore that credit is given for essay responses that are "well rea-
soned" or "logical" even if those responses ultimately reach the wrong
legal conclusion.8 9 The California Bar description exemplifies many of
these trends and resembles the descriptions in other states:
[The essay] part of the examination is designed to measure an appli-
cant's ability to analyze legal issues arising from fact situations.
Answers are expected to demonstrate the applicant's ability to analyze
the facts of the question, to tell the difference between material facts and
immaterial facts, and to discern the points of law and fact upon which
the question turns .... The answer should evidence the applicant's
ability to apply the law to the given facts and to reason in a logical
lawyer-like manner from the premises adopted to a sound
conclusion. 90
VI. BREAKING DOWN "THINKING LIKE A LAWYER" INTO
COGNITIVE COMPONENTS9 1
The above discussion examines numerous sources that highlight
various conceptions of what it means to "think like a lawyer," specifi-
cally, what cognitive skills lawyers themselves believe are important as
well as what cognitive skills legal examinations, like the LSAT and bar
exam, are designed to address. The remainder of this article will draw
upon that discussion and analyze the volume of literature that, to vary-
ing degrees, seeks to describe activity of thinking like a lawyer. To
inform the literature analysis, this article will also consider the results
of a written survey (the "Regent survey") conducted in 2005, 2006,
and 2007 of 283 second and third-year law students at Regent Univer-
and essential capacity for the practice of law. Your grade will be based on your ability
to identify and analyze issues and to present an organized, coherent and well-written
response within the prescribed format. The response must be lawyer-like.").
89. See New York State of Bar Examiners, supra note 88 ("Appropriate credit is
given in the grading of essay answers for well reasoned analyses of the issues and legal
principles even though the final conclusion itself may be incorrect."); Pennsylvania
Board of Bar Examiners, supra note 88 ("[Tlhe value of an essay answer depends not
so much upon the correctness of the conclusion(s), as upon the recognition of issues
and the quality of the discussion that evidences an ability to apply the law to the facts
presented, and to reason in a logical manner .. "). But see The Mississippi Supreme
Court, supra note 88 ("The grade of the paper shall be measured by the reasoning
power as well as by the correctness of incorrectness of the answer.").
90. The State Bar of California, supra note 86 (emphasis added).
91. For a description of results of a survey of entering law students on what it
means to "think like a lawyer," see Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 145-95. In
their essays on the topic, students frequently mentioned the following skills as relevant
to thinking like a lawyer: "analysis, logical thinking, deductive reasoning, attention to
detail, communication skills, and prediction." Id. at 150.
436 [Vol. 29:413
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sity School of Law in which they were asked to "describe . . .what it
means to think like a lawyer.
' 9 2
A. Overall Structure of Legal Thinking
1. Mental Problem Solving
Lawyers are problem solvers.93 This emphasis on legal problem
solving was underscored in the influential MacCrate Report, discussed
above.94 In the report, the ABA task force identified "problem solving"
as the most important "fundamental lawyering skill:"95
Skill § 1: Problem Solving
In order to develop and evaluate strategies for solving a problem or
accomplishing an objective, a lawyer should be familiar with the skills
and concepts involved in:
1.1 Identifying and Diagnosing the Problem;
1.2 Generating Alternative Solutions and Strategies;
1.3 Developing a Plan of Action;
1.4 Implementing the Plan;
1.5 Keeping the Planning Process Open to New Information and New
Ideas.96
Different lawyer surveys, the LSAC Study, and bar examiners' com-
mentary discussed above further reflect the centrality of problem solv-
92. In April 2005, April 2006, September 2006, January 2007, and February 2007,
1 surveyed 252 second and third-year Regent law students. I surveyed 249 of the
students in several classes: Advanced Legal Reasoning, Analysis & Writing, Business
Associations, Evidence, Family Law, Individual Federal Income Tax, and Professional
Responsibility. I distributed the survey form to the students near the end of a class
period and asked them to complete it and return it to me. I distributed the survey to
the three other students outside of the class setting because they were not in any of the
classes I surveyed. I have on file all 252 survey forms. The form for all students
instructed them that participation in the survey was voluntary and did not affect their
grade in that or any course. The specific question on survey read:
Please describe below what it means to "think like a lawyer."
Use the back if needed. In your description, do not focus exclusively on any
principles you have learned in this course. Rather, draw upon all your
experiences in drafting your description.
93. See, e.g., Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 144; Gerald P. Lopez, Lay
Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1984) ("Lawyering means problem-solving.").
94. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
95. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 138.
96. Id. These conclusions are similar to those in the Report on Lawyer
Competencies approved by the ABA's General Practice Section in 1991. That report
lists "Engage in legal problem solving" as the most important specific competency
expected of new general practice attorneys. See Steven C. Bahls, Preparing General
Practice Attorneys: Context-Based Lawyer Competencies, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 63, 80
(1991).
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ing to legal thinking.97 Several students in the Regent survey similarly
emphasized problem solving as a fundamental aspect of thinking like a
lawyer, and one student captured it well when she wrote that "to think
like a lawyer is to think strategically." This centrality of problem solv-
ing explains why the alternative law school entrance test Marjorie
Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck are developing will test "practical judg-
ment" by asking applicants to solve problems in various settings,
including nonlegal contexts. 98
As noted above, lawyers also tend to be "thinkers."99 Legal prob-
lem solving therefore emphasizes mental processes; and as Gary Blasi
observes, in such problem solving, lawyers should consider alterna-
tives and "[tlhink before [they] act."' 00 In opining on the thinking
skills law students should develop, Eric DeGroff and Kathleen McKee
contend that law students should acquire a proficiency in carrying out
the mental processes of decoding,' 0 ' cataloguing,' 0 2 retrieving, 10 3 and
encoding, 10 4 relevant legal concepts and related factual material.'0 5
The first two processes of decoding (absorbing) and cataloguing
(processing) relate to the individual's learning style.' 0 6  These
processes also relate to thinking like a lawyer. However, because law-
yers are problem solvers, they must also complete the last two
processes to resolve the legal issue before them.
97. See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text (describing surveys and LSAC
Study) and notes 80, 88 (describing commentary on specific bar exams).
98. See Hall, supra note 54, at 24. Hall reports:
A sample question might ask the applicant to take the role of a team leader at
a company. Because of frequent employee tardiness, the head of the
company has decided that anyone who comes in late will be fired. One of the
applicant's team members, the smartest and hardest worker in the group,
arrives five minutes late a few days later. What does the applicant do?
Id.
99. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
100. Blasi, supra note 46, at 328.
101. DeGroff & McKee, supra note 3, at 508 & n.42 ("'Decoding' involves the in-
processing of substantive law and related factual information.").
102. Id. at 508 & n.43 ("'Cataloguing' involves identifying relationships of decoded
information and creating a coherent framework within which to file it.").
103. Id. at 508 & n.44 ("'Retrieval' entails the recall of relevant legal concepts when
presented with a particular legal issue or problem.").
104. Id. at 508 & n.45 ("'Encoding' requires the selection of legal concepts relevant
to a particular legal issue or problem and the framing of an appropriate strategy to
respond to the problem.").
105. Id. at 508.
106. Id. at 508-16 (discussing the concept of "learning styles" and the extensive
scholarship on the subject).
438 [Vol. 29:413
26
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss3/2
DECONSTRUCTING THINKING LIKE A LAWYER
Various scholars discussing legal reasoning have offered formulas
for assessing how lawyers solve problems. Most basically, one of the
hallmarks of legal thinking is its emphasis not so much on the resolu-
tion of the problem, but on the process of getting to that resolution. 10
7
Legal educators thus underscore that law students need not just learn
the content of laws but also the analytical processes used to apply that
content to solve problems."°8 The ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct similarly recognize in the official commentary to the rule on
lawyer "competence" that competency includes analytical, problem
solving skills that are independent of the lawyer's knowledge of a par-
ticular area of law.1
0 9
In sum, problem solving serves as the overall structure for legal
thinking. This article therefore offers a flowchart in the Appendix that
presents legal thinking in a problem solving framework. This frame-
work includes the specific cognitive components to thinking like a law-
yer, and the article will refer to specific steps outlined in the chart as
particular components are discussed.
2. Asking Questions
As a general principle, lawyers must ask questions to solve the
legal problems they confront; and legal education is designed, in part,
to teach students which questions to ask." 0  Scholars therefore have
attempted to offer specific questions that legal thinkers can ask of all
legal problems in order to reach defensible conclusions. Several schol-
ars and surveys of lawyers emphasize that lawyers should first ask
107. See, e.g., BRAND & WHITE, supra note 3, at 140.
108. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 14 ("While students must know the rules and
case holdings and must be able to identify legal questions, they are ultimately
evaluated as law students and lawyers by how well they perform legal analysis.").
109. The official comment to Rule 1.1 ("Competence") provides:
A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to
handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly
admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience.
Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of
evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the
most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal
problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any
particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate
representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2003) (emphasis added).
110. In my work with first-year law students as part of Regent's Academic Success
Program, I have often observed that one of my tasks is to teach students how to know
which questions they should ask themselves as they learn material and seek to solve
legal problems.
2007]
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questions to amass all the relevant facts in the case."' Furthermore,
in his book A Student's Guide to Legal Analysis: Thinking Like a Lawyer,
Patrick M. McFadden contends that "there are only three legal ques-
tions" that lawyers and judges try to answer in solving legal problems:
"Is there a law?"; "Has it been violated?"; and'"What will be done about
it?" 1 12 He adds that to think like a lawyer is simply to ask these three
questions, which are "the kinds of questions lawyers and judges ask
about the situations they confront."' 13 Other scholars have offered for-
mulas that are not as simplistic but follow the basic format of present-
ing certain questions that legal thinkers must ask of any legal
problem.1
14
Because lawyers are problem solvers and work through questions
to reach the solution to those problems, lawyers progress through cer-
tain mental processes in solving problems. Many law students become
all too familiar with the standard formula for analyzing and answering
a law school hypothetical fact problem: Issue, Rule, Analysis (or Appli-
cation), Conclusion (IRAC)." 15  Some educators contend that the
formula is simplistic or that it is not applicable to certain types of law
school examination questions. 1 6 Unlike in answering certain law
111. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 4, at 140.
112. PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS: THINKING LIKE A
LAWYER 11 (2001) (reasoning "[e]very legal situation will raise at least one of these
questions, or it's not legal"). McFadden notes that the three questions quoted in the
text are cast in a way that pertains to litigation. He reasons that transactional
attorneys might ask the same three questions but cast them in more-forward thinking
language: "(1) Are there any potentially relevant laws? (2) Would any of them be
violated? And (3) What might be done about these violations?" Id.
113. Id. at xvi.
114. See, e.g., SHELDON MARGULIES & KENNETH LASSON, LEARNING LAW: THE MASTERY
OF LEGAL LOGIC 95-99 (1993) (offering six questions that govern the resolution of
"almost all lawsuits").
115. In presenting the IRAC formula to students, some authors describe the "A" as
referring to "application," as opposed to "analysis." See, e.g., STROPUS & TAYLOR, supra
note 13, at 105. Others discuss a variation of IRAC called "CRAC," in which the
conclusion is stated first, followed by the rule, analysis/application, and conclusion
again. See, e.g., RAMY, supra note 13, at 114. Still others take the basic IRAC format
and expand it to apply to different types of law school questions. See, e.g., DENNIS
TONSING, 1000 DAYS TO THE BAR BUT THE PRACTICE OF LAW BEGINS Now 133-35 (2003)
(discussing the TICRA-FLIPC approach, which stands for "Topic, Issue or Conclusion
followed by the Rule which leads to the Analysis, which is composed of Facts and Law
Interwoven with Policy, leading to a logical Conclusion").
116. These educators often contend that IRAC, while helpful to students, is deficient
in describing to students what they need to know to answer hypothetical essay
questions. See, e.g., WENTWORTH MILLER, THE LEGAL ESSAY ExAM WRITING PRIMER 3 &
n.6 (5th ed. 2000) ("[Wlhile useful, even a revelation to the neophyte law student,
28
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss3/2
DECONSTRUCTING THINKING LIKE A LAWYER
school questions, thinking like a lawyer in the practice context involves
solving problems for clients and all four steps are important to reach-
ing an evaluation of the legality of particular action. For this reason,
the framework remarkably resembles many of the analytical
frameworks discussed above. 1 7 Specifically, lawyer surveys and the
MacCrate Report reveal that analysis and fact-application are impor-
tant lawyering skills;" 8 the LSAC Study points to the importance of
issue identification and rule application as important law school
skills;" 9 and the LSAT and bar exam information both highlight the
importance of each of the IRAC steps.'2 ° IRAC thus serves as a foun-
dational framework that is relevant, not just to answering essay ques-
tions in law school, but also to identifying the different components of
thinking like a lawyer. IRAC steps, therefore, are reflected in the steps
outlined in the Appendix.
3. Searching for Coherence
In working through legal analytical frameworks, like IRAC, legal
thinkers are engaging in a search for coherence in looking for connec-
tions and linkages among the kernels of information present in a legal
problem.'' According to James Gardner, "Every legal advocate faces
IRAC is no more than the formulaic what in terms of setting up a discussion of an
issue."); RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL & JEREMY PAUL, GETrING TO MAYBE: HOW TO EXCEL ON
LAW SCHOOL EXAMS 10, 147-49, 271-72 (1999) ("[Alttempting to reduce law exam-
taking to four simple steps is a lot like attempting to reduce guitar playing to four
simple chords: It's not a bad way to start, but until you get well beyond it, no one is
going to mistake you for B.B. King."). Cf. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 212 (reasoning
that IRAC is not applicable to examination questions of law or policy).
117. Moreover, sophisticated discussions of legal reasoning still advance
frameworks that resemble the IRAC form. See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR
LAWYERS 68 (3d ed. 1997) ("Legal analysis is a three-step procedure: (1) selecting or
choosing the legal precept, (2) interpreting that precept and (3) applying it, as
interpreted, to the case at hand.").
118. See supra notes 28-29, 47-57 and accompanying text. The MacCrate Report
specifically explains that its second fundamental lawyering skills requires lawyers to
learn to "analyze and apply legal rules and principles." See MAcCRATE REPORT,
available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/onlinepubs/maccrate.html#
B.%200verview%20of%2Othe%2OSkills%20and%2OValues%20Analyzed (last visited
Feb. 7, 2007).
119. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 62-90 and accompanying text.
121. See BURTON, supra note 4, at 107 (reasoning that lawyers strive to make
"coherent" arguments). "Coherence" has become a term of art in legal discourse to
refer to particular notions of jurisprudence and epistemology. See, e.g., Joseph Raz,
The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REv. 273 (1992). By using "coherence" here, I
intend an ordinary meaning as defined by "sticking together, connected, consistent."
20071
29
Gantt: Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer: Analyzing the Cognitive Co
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2007
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
the challenge of creating order out of chaos. The advocate must take an
undisciplined mass of information and argument and reshape it into a
tool capable of converting the most skeptical decisionmaker to the
advocate's point of view."'1 22 Patrick McFadden further describes this
principle:
Despite the intellectual prejudices of our postmodern world, the law
still assumes that the truth is coherent. A good legal story is a coherent
story. It has to make sense. In law, things happen in order, motiva-
tions are understandable, and what we expect to happen usually hap-
pens; the unusual, the unique, and the unexpected must be carefully
explained. The legal storyteller, speaking and writing within the
bounds of factual truth and expository coherence, labors within a more
constricted range of mobility than novelists or poets.' 2
3
Principles of relevance and logic, discussed below, provide the
structure for coherent legal arguments; but apart from these principles,
the fundamental starting point for lawyers is a search for organization,
relationship, and order. In a sense, the lawyers' search for coherence is
not different from the nonlawyers'. A new branch of cognitive psychol-
ogy called coherence-based reasoning posits that individuals facing
complex decisions tend to shift their view of the considerations to sup-
port a state of coherence in which one of the solutions seems clearly
preferable to the others. 12 4 Individuals often make these shifts subcon-
sciously, believing that their current beliefs are the ones they have
always held.' 25 Although legal thinkers may similarly subconsciously
shift their thinking as they move to the proposed solution,' 26 they at
least intentionally recognize the need for a coherent progression of
thought as they solve legal problems. This intention towards coher-
NEW WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 82 (1991). Lawyers' search for coherence is related to
their ability to see both the "forest" and the "trees" by discerning how the details
involved in a legal problem relate to the larger, problem-solving framework. See infra
note 222.
122. JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF
EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 3 (1993) (emphasis added).
123. MCFADDEN, supra note 112, at 172.
124. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal
Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 516-517 (2004) (summarizing the findings of
coherence-based reasoning research).
125. Id. at 533.
126. See id. at 549 & n.117 (contending that coherence-based reasoning may
support why virtually every argument discussed in a judicial opinion converges to the
same conclusion) (citing Dan Simon, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look
through the Lens of Cognitive Psychology, 67 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1097, 1129-39 (2002);
Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L. J. 1, 121-
41(1998)).
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ence begins in law school when law students learn the importance of
organizing the information discussed in a course into a course out-
line.' 27 Legal thinkers therefore proceed to solve problems by crafting
outlines and diagrams, whether mentally or on paper, that show the
connectedness of the issues involved in the problem before them.
4. Thinking Linearly
The IRAC framework and the search for coherence serve as good
starting points for describing generally the cognitive thought processes
lawyers customarily address in solving legal problems. A next point of
reference is the fact that, in defining what it means to "think like a
lawyer," many scholars argue and students agree that such thinking
must be "logical."' 28 State bars similarly assert that their bar examina-
tions assess whether applicants can think and write "logically."12 9 An
immediate response to such statements is a yearning to understand
what is meant by the term logic.
The term logic evokes a myriad of sophisticated principles. 3 '
However, as Norman Brand and John White contend, to reason logi-
cally in a legal context most directly connotes linear thinking.' Such
thinking involves proceeding step-by-step in a consistent fashion to
solve a legal problem. More specifically, it involves applying a series of
questions to the legal problem and continuing depending on the
127. See STROPUS & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 65 ("You need to understand,
organize, and synthesize the material you cover over a semester so that you can apply it
to different fact situations .... The best way to accomplish this goal is to make your
own outline.").
128. See Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 150, 193 (recounting student
definitions that described thinking like a lawyer to include "logical" thinking or
reasoning); BRAND & WHITE, supra note 3, at 133 ("[I]f we were to attempt to identify
the one characteristic that everyone agrees lawyers should have, it would probably be
an ability to think logically."). Many students in the Regent survey replied that legal
thinking involves logic or logical reasoning. For instance, one third-year student wrote,
"To 'think like a lawyer' means to consider all reasonable scenarios before making a
conclusion. In addition, you must think logically about how to reach that conclusion
.... " Emphasizing logic, however, was not a dominant theme in the Regent survey
responses. Responses appeared to focus more heavily on more general concepts like
analytical and critical thinking.
129. See, e.g., BRAND & WHITE, supra note 3, at 14-15 (noting how the California Bar
Examination includes instructions telling applicants that their essay answers should
evidence their ability to "reason logically").
130. For a detailed discussion on the role of logic in legal thinking, see Wilson
Huhn, The Use and Limits of Syllogistic Reasoning in Briefing Cases, 42 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 813 (2002) [hereinafter Huhn, Syllogistic Reasoning].
131. BRAND & WHITE, supra note 3, at 134.
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answer to the preceding question.13 2 This progression need not be
unidirectional; for instance, because the law determines the relevance
of facts, legal thinkers move back and forth between the facts and the
law as they narrow the legal issue.1 33 For this reason, legal thinkers
often construct flowcharts or decision trees to visualize the decision-
making steps through which they must progress to solve a particular
legal problem. 1 3 4 This article thus has utilized the flowchart format in
the Appendix in visualizing the steps in legal thinking generally.
5. Crafting Arguments
Finally, in discussing the overall structure of legal problem solv-
ing, it must be recognized that lawyers do not solve problems in the
abstract; rather, lawyering, at its core, involves helping clients evaluate
the legality of particular actions.13 5 In so doing, lawyers are called
upon to make predictions, predictions about how courts or other adju-
dicative bodies will assess the legality of the actions at issue. 136 Legal
problem solving, therefore, involves solving problems to advance the
client's interest, and one of the principal techniques lawyers employ to
132. Id. at 134. For this reason, Brand and White compare legal thinking to
computer logic in which computers "decide" things based on working through a series
of "yes/no, on/off' questions. Id.
133. See BURTON, supra note 4, at 141 (reasoning that in approaching a new legal
issue, one should "begin a process of (1) gathering facts to narrow the focus of legal
research, (2) conducting preliminary legal research, (3) gathering more facts in light of
that research, (4) conducting further legal research in light of those facts, and so on.").
134. See BRAND & WHITE, supra note 3, at 137-40 (reasoning that constructing flow
charts helps individuals "think like a lawyer"); STROPUS & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at
79-96 (devoting an entire chapter to information for law students on how to construct
flow charts as a method to solving legal problems).
135. E.g., DAVID BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH 3 (1991) ("[N]o matter who the client, what the substantive legal issues or
whether the situation involves litigation or planning, your principal role as lawyer will
almost always be the same-to help clients achieve effective solutions to their
problems."). "Clients" in this context should be construed broadly to include
situations when an organization is the client, a government entity is the client, or the
identity of the client is unclear (such as in some forms of government representation).
Cf. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 142 n.2 (recognizing that legal problem-
solving principles apply even when the lawyer is not representing a client). Some
scholars have taken a more expansive view of the problems lawyers are trying to solve.
See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 93, at 2 ("Problem-solving involves perceiving that the
world we would like varies from the world as it is and trying to move the world in the
desired direction.").
136. BURTON, supra note 4, at 1 (noting, inter alia, that "[t]he chief feature of legal
reasoning is that it is used in the process of anticipating or settling important disputes
in advanced societies").
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represent that interest is through making arguments and responding to
the arguments of others. 137 For this reason, numerous legal texts
designed for law students and lawyers concentrate on how to make
good arguments and rebut those of others. 138 Many of these authors
have offered criteria for what constitutes a good legal argument.
139
Others have written texts that discuss the particular logical fallacies
that often arise in legal argumentation. 140 The importance of crafting
arguments thus must factor into the overall structure of legal thinking.
B. Identifying Legal Issues
Given the structure of legal thinking as problem solving, the first
step, as the MacCrate Report provides, is to identify the problem.
14 1
This skill of identifying the problem is related to the skill traditionally
tested in law schools of being able to "spot the issue"'142 and is placed
as the first decisional step in the Appendix. In identifying the prob-
lem, lawyers ask questions, as noted above, but the issue remains what
questions should they ask.
1. Assessing Relevance
A first aspect of the questions lawyers ask is that their questions
are designed to distill relevant information from the irrelevant.' 43 The
137. See J.S. COVINGTON, JR., THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT AND PROOF: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND ANALYSES 3 (2006) ("Argument, defined as discourse containing
inference, is the major part of legal work."). A classic definition of argument is "a
group of statements, one of more of which (the premises) support or provide evidence
for another (the conclusion)." T. EDWARD DAMER, ATTACKING FAULTY REASONING: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FALLACY-FREE ARGUMENTS 11 (4th ed. 2001).
138. See, e.g., HUHN, supra note 2, at 12 (contending that thinking like a lawyer
consists of learning to make and recognize five types of arguments); PIERRE SCHLAG &
DAVID SKOVER, TACTICS OF LEGAL REASONING 1 (1986) (noting on the first line of the
Introduction that "[tihis book is designed to help lawyers and law students criticize
and attack legal arguments").
139. See, e.g., MCFADDEN, supra note 112, at 170 (contending that good legal
arguments have the qualities of truth, precision, coherence, and logic).
140. BRAND & WHITE, supra note 3, at 145-47; ALDISERT, supra note 117, at xii-xviii;
COVINGTON, supra note 137, at 10-24; DOUGLAS LIND, LAW AND LEGAL REASONING ix-xiv
(2001).
141. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 142.
142. See STROPUS & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 104; SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 203-
04.
143. STROPUS & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 113 (including the skill of discerning
relevant information in a list of skills that are important to successful lawyering);
Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 191, 195 (reproducing student essays that
described thinking like a lawyer as including the ability "to decide which facts and
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search for relevance is a specific example of lawyers' task of creating
"order out of chaos."'1 4 4
Although only a few judicial opinions have discussed explicitly
what it means to "think like a lawyer,"'145 the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Maniki v. Mass Transit Administration,'46 focused on this
analytical ability of assessing relevance as central to the concept. In
the case, the court considered whether the trial court properly dis-
missed a lawyer complaint when the complaint was over sixty pages in
length, with 241 paragraphs.' 47 The opposing party moved to dismiss
the complaint, alleging "that it was 'rambling' and constituted 'an
assemblage of opinions, argument, recitations of evidentiary minutiae,
and extraneous allegations."" 4 Commenting that she had been una-
ble to discern a cause of action in the first forty pages, the trial judge
dismissed the complaint with leave to amend.' 49
In reviewing the dismissal, the appellate court observed that
"Maryland Rule 2-303(b) requires that 'each averment of a pleading
shall be simple, concise, and direct' and that it 'shall contain only such
statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleader's entitle-
ment to relief.' "1 50 The court ruled that the trial judge properly dis-
missed the complaint pursuant to that rule. In its reasoning, the court
stated that the attorney had failed to think like a lawyer:
issues are pertinent and which ones are not" and "to determine what is essential, and
what is superfluous and distracting").
144. GARDNER, supra note 122, at 3.
145. Most judicial discussions of what it means to "think like a lawyer" have
centered on whether criminal defendants proceeding pro se can obtain relief on
certain issues even though they failed properly to raise those issues in prior
proceedings. In such cases, several courts have ruled that the "failure to act or think
like a lawyer" is not considered cause for neglecting to assert such issues. See, e.g.,
U.S. ex rel. Matthews v. Hinsley, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57101,WL 2191320 at *197
(N.D. II. July 27, 2006) (quoting Henderson v. Cohn, 919 F.2d 1270, 1272 (7th
Cir.1990)). In these references, the courts appear to be referencing not so much to the
analytical components to legal thinking but rather to the straightforward fact of
whether the defendant knows the law. See id. (noting immediately before the
quotation that "ignorance of the law" is not sufficient to excuse a failure to properly a
raise claim). As in much of the other literature, some courts have used the phrase
without defining it. See Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(recounting how individual was discovered not to be an attorney because he "did not
quite 'think like a lawyer"').
146. 758 A.2d 95 (Md. Ct. App. 2000).
147. Id. at 100.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. The court highlighted that the Maryland rule was different from the federal
pleading requirements. Id.
446 [Vol. 29:413
34
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss3/2
DECONSTRUCTING THINKING LIKE A LAWYER
[W]hen drafting a Maryland circuit court complaint, it is the responsi-
bility of counsel to distill from the client's narrative and any other rele-
vant information acquired by investigation a concise statement of facts
that will identify for the professional reader, be it adverse counsel or
the court, the cause of action that is being asserted. That is the essence
of "thinking like a lawyer." 1
The court's reasoning underscores that being able to distill rele-
vant from irrelevant information is essential to thinking like a lawyer.
This emphasis on assessing relevancy mirrors the emphasis in the
skills tested on many bar exams. Specifically, materials describing the
MEE and several state bar exams expressly highlight the importance of
applicants' being able to discern irrelevant from relevant informa-
tion.15 2 Furthermore, a few Regent students recognized this emphasis
in their survey descriptions of what it means to think like a lawyer.
1 53
Identifying, in a general sense, how lawyers determine relevance is
difficult to do because "relevance" by definition depends on the spe-
cific problem being solved. 1 5 4 Some scholars who have analyzed rele-
vance have started from the position that the lawyer knows the legal
rules at issue and thus is focused on discerning relevant facts based on
those rules. 1 5 5 This starting point is acceptable for "expert" lawyers.
Indeed, cognitive science research has demonstrated that experts in
various fields proceed to solve a problem by "recognizing" in the prob-
lem a pattern of a particular kind and then "retrieving" a solution from
a stored catalog of solutions to similar problems.' 56 Such lawyers have
well-developed "substantive schemata," or frameworks of similar legal
problems, and they strive to fit the current situation within one of
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 80, 86-87 and accompanying text. Maryland and Texas are two
states that explicitly mention the importance of distilling relevant information. Texas
specifically mentions the importance in describing the MPT, but its description is
noteworthy because it expounds upon the official MPT description put forth by the
National Conference. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
153. For instance, one third-year student wrote, "Lawyers should think about all the
relevant facts and relevant rules before coming to a conclusion."
154. See WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1526 (2d ed. 1983)
(defining "relevant" as "bearing upon or relating to the matter in hand; to the point;
pertinent; applicable; as, the testimony is relevant to the case; the argument is relevant
to the question: opposed to irrelevant").
155. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 4, at 98.
156. Blasi, supra note 45, at 335-36 (discussing, inter alia, research on expert chess
players that shows that what distinguishes such players from novices is the experts'
ability to remember board positions).
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these schemata.' 5 7 In solving a legal problem, seasoned lawyers draw
from their experience to identify the relevant rules and then fit the
relevant facts into the problem framework.'5 8 How lawyers proceed
from this point gives rise to complicated issues of relevance, which are
discussed below.
a. Determining Relevance Before Rules Are Known
Even more complicated, however, are the parameters lawyers use
to determine relevance when they do not know the legal rule(s) upon
which to base their decisions. Suppose, for instance, a client comes to
see a lawyer and describes a complex factual situation and then ends
with, "Do I have a case against x?" The lawyer may not be familiar
with the types of facts involved in the situation and may have no
knowledge of any legal rule that pertains to the situation as described.
Lawyers should, of course, ask the client questions to get an accurate
account of the facts, 159 but a lawyer who knows nothing about the type
of problem may have no idea when to delve more deeply into a particu-
lar factual aspect of the case. 6o Some have contended that legal prob-
lem solving in such cases may begin with little more structure than a
"fishing expedition.' 16 1 But does legal thinking in fact involve a more
structured approach? In general, how does the lawyer proceed in such
a situation?' 62
Cognitive science is again instructive. Allen Newell and Herbert
Simon have advanced the modern framework in the field of cognitive
157. See Paula Lustbader, Construction Sites, Building Types, and Bridging Gaps: A
Cognitive Theory of the Learning Progression of Law Students, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
315, 326-27 (1997). Lustbader adds that this development of schemata distinguishes
expert from novice legal thinkers in the area. Id. ("ecause experts have command of a
large amount of domain-specific knowledge, they can classify problems and approach
problem solving quickly .... In contrast, novices may get lost in the details of a
problem without identifying its general category. This results in an inefficient and
faulty analysis."); see also Lustbader, Dreams, supra note 10, at 850-51 (discussing the
relevance of substantive schemata to legal instruction).
158. See Appendix.
159. See BURTON, supra note 4, at 140-41.
160. As stated in footnote 110, 1 have learned that one aspect of legal thinking that
students should develop is knowing when to ask questions and knowing which
questions to ask. See supra note 111.
161. BURTON, supra note 4, at 141.
162. This situation is analogous to the law student who reads a hypothetical fact
pattern essay question on an exam and spots no issues and therefore has no
framework through which to proceed (except for the general structure of the course at
issue).
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science for the systematic analysis of problem solving.' 6 3 Newell and
Simon posit that problem solving progresses through four stages: (1)
describing the beginning state of affairs; (2) describing the goal state;
(3) describing those actions or steps (i.e., the "operators") that can be
taken to change the beginning state of affairs; and (4) identifying any
constraints in moving to the goal, such as any limits on the number of
times an operator can be used.164 Problem solving thus becomes find-
ing the appropriate sequence of operators to move from the starting
state to the goal state.
16 5
In addressing the specific contours of legal problem solving, Saun-
ders and Levine assert:
The lawyer does not start from general principles and reason "for-
ward" to some as yet unknown inevitable conclusion. Rather, the law-
yer begins with a conclusion or a claim-the client's goal. He or she
then designs justificatory strategies for reaching that goal, reasoning
backward through a process akin to "reverse engineering."
'1 6 6
Anthony Amsterdam calls this process "ends-means thinking,"
whereby the lawyer confronts a fact situation presenting a problem,
identifies the possible outcomes or goals, constructs ways of reaching
those goals, and then selects the best option.16 7 He adds that end-
means thinking entails "[R]easoning backward from goals, by mapping
the various roads that might be taken to each goal, by proceeding back-
ward step by step along each road and asking what steps have to be
taken before each following step can be taken."
'1 6 8
163. Blasi, supra note 45, at 333. Newell and Simon describe a problem "abstractly
as the situation that arises when one wants to achieve a different state of affairs and it
is not obvious how to get there." Id. (discussing Newell and Simon).
164. See id. (citing DANIEL N. OSHERSON & EDWARD E. SMITH, EDS., THINKING: AN
INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE 118 (1991)).
165. Id. at 334. With modern computer legal research, lawyers and law students
can sift through the possibilities more quickly using the "natural language" search
functions on Lexis and Westlaw. However, they still need to determine the relevant
words to type in the search; the computer only knows about the legal problem what
the searcher tells it.
166. Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 183 (citing, inter alia, CLARENCE MORRIS,
How LAWYERS THINK 42 (1937)).
167. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st Century Perspective,
34J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 614 (1984).
168. Id. The descriptions of "forward" and "backward" reasoning discussed in the
text do not correspond precisely to the terms as used in the field of cognitive
psychology. See Stefan H. Krieger, Domain Knowledge and the Teaching of Creative Legal
Problem Solving, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 149, 169-70 (2004). Unlike the description in the
text, cognitive psychologists do not conceive of forward reasoning as reasoning that
moves towards an unknown conclusion. They conceive that in both "forward" and
2007]
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In all these conceptions of problem solving, lawyers must identify
a goal state in the beginning of their decisionmaking process. Theoret-
ically, any problem solver could go through all the possible sequences
of operators to find the goal state (i.e., solution), but such a process is
impossible in most cases because of the "combinatorial explosion" of
possible sequences that would have to be examined. 1 69
Simon and Newell contend that problem solvers apply heuristic
principles to reduce the number of possible paths to the solution. 170
Legal scholars have recently drawn upon research from cognitive sci-
ence and psychology to consider the relevance of heuristics to the
thinking of lawyers and judges.17 ' Heuristics are defined simply as
"1172 "rube7o
"mental shortcuts" or "rules of thumb.' 7 3  They are used to
decrease the complexity Of information that individuals assess in mak-
ing decisions. 1 74 Heuristics often lead decisionmakers to correct solu-
tions, but sometimes they can produce cognitive biases that cause
decisionmakers improperly to discount material information or other-
"backward" reasoning, the decisionmaker identifies one or more hypotheses early in
the problem solving process and then moves towards a solution based on those
starting points. Id. The two forms differ, in part, in how explicitly the decisionmaker
tests the validity of his hypotheses as he moves towards problem solution. Those
employing forward reasoning use experience and other sources of knowledge to come
to a conclusion relatively quickly. In contrast, those employing backward reasoning
develop alternative hypotheses initially and then work backwards as they test these
hypotheses with the available data. Id. Based on these conceptions, lawyers can
employ either forward or backward reasoning as they solve client problems. See Mark
Neal Aaronson & Stefan H. Krieger, Teaching Problem-Solving Lawyering: An Exchange
of Ideas, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 485, 499 (2005).
169. Blasi, supra note 45, at 334. With modern computer legal research, lawyers
and law students can sift through the possibilities more quickly using the "natural
language" search functions on Lexis and Westlaw. However, they still need to
determine the relevant words to type in the search; the computer only knows about the
legal problem what the searcher tells it.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Insights From Cognitive Psychology, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC.
42, 44-45 (2004); Ian Weinstein, Don't Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in
Legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 789-90 (2003); Alvin I. Goldman,
Simple Heuristics and Legal Evidence, 2 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 215 (2003).
172. Weinstein, supra note 171, at 789.
173. Guthrie, supra note 171, at 44.
174. Morrell E. Mullins, Sr., Tool, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory
Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 49 (2003).
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wise make unwise judgments. 175 Relevant literature discusses numer-
ous of types of heuristics. 1 7
6
Heuristics are, by definition, used by ordinary thinkers and are
not unique to legal thinkers.' 77  The question remains, however,
whether legal thinkers tend to use certain types of heuristics more
than others.'17  Although legal thinkers in unfamiliar situations may
not be able to rely upon the higher-order recognition techniques used
by the expert thinkers, they still undeniably rely on the "recognition
heuristic" to help them solve problems. Recognition is a powerful cog-
nitive device,' 79 and legal thinkers who have no familiarity with the
particular legal problem at issue should begin to recognize parts of the
situation as resembling something they have addressed in the past.'8 °
175. Guthrie, supra note 171, at 44; see also Goldman, supra note 171, at 218
("Simple heuristics are touted as having an accuracy rate that is comparable to several
highly complex procedures that other statisticians or decision theorists have
advocated.").
176. Mullins, supra note 174, at 48-53 (noting that the list of heuristics can be "spun
out at length"). One example is "anchoring and adjustment," which contends that
when individuals estimate the value of something they are usually "heavily influenced
by the first number they encounter." This tendency is usually appropriate since the
first number, such as the price of an item, tends to give the decisionmaker some
material information about the item's value. However, even if the first number is not
relevant, decisionmakers are often nevertheless problematically influenced. See
Guthrie, supra note 171, at 44 (discussing research demonstrating this bias).
177. See Goldman, supra note 171, at 215 (defining heuristics as "'fast and frugal'
inference procedures that are claimed to be used by ordinary thinkers and to be as
accurate as more complex strategies").
178. Individuals use heuristics to predict an outcome in the face of an uncertain
situation, and therefore, as Morrell Mullins suggests, legal thinkers do not use
heuristics in all situations. For instance, judges would not employ heuristics in the
traditional sense in predicting how they will interpret a statute because the outcome is
within their control. See Mullins, supra note 174, at 53-54. However, lawyers might
employ heuristics when they predict how the judges will rule because they are
operating under conditions of uncertainty. See id. at 54 n.282. Moreover, judges may
employ heuristics in their role when they assess, for instance, how likely it is that a
witness's testimony about an event reflects what actually happened. See Michael J.
Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by
Heuristics, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 213, 216
(Hal R. Arks & Kenneth R. Hammond, eds., 1986) ("Most legal decision making, like
that in many other areas of complex activity, is done under conditions of
uncertainty."); cf. HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 1-33
(2003) (including a chapter on "decision analysis" for lawyers).
179. Saks & Kidd, supra note 178, at 217.
180. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 207-08 (reasoning how spotting the issues in a
legal problem involves "recognizing patterns" between the problem and other
situations with which the legal thinker is familiar).
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Such is part of the power of the case method in legal education. A
lawyer who faces the client question "Do I have a case against x?" is
likely to recognize something in the fact pattern presented to cause the
lawyer to raise further questions. The lawyer may remember how a
fact in the client's situation resembles a fact she read in a case in law
school, for instance. In another instance, the lawyer may note that the
situation involves a purported agreement between the parties and rec-
ognize it as a potential contract although the lawyer does not know the
specific legal rule that applies in the particular case. Lawyers can draw
upon this previous experience because steeped in the law is the princi-
ple of stare decisis. 181 Lawyers therefore assess a new situation with
the expectation that the law will view a relevantly similar situation the
same as it did in the past.
A related heuristic upon which lawyers rely is the "representative
heuristic," in which thinkers are asked to judge whether "an object or
event A is a member of a class or process B."' 82 Thinkers employ this
heuristic by considering the degree to which A resembles B. 18 3 As a
result, a lawyer might consider the facts in the situation before him
and evaluate the degree to which those facts resemble the facts in a
previous case.
This heuristic is akin to analogical reasoning, discussed below,' 84
and is subject to similar pitfalls of such reasoning in that thinkers over-
look the fact that similarities between items are significant depending
on the relevance, quantity, and quality of those similarities.185 Empiri-
cal research on this heuristic confirms that individuals rely on the sim-
ilarities they perceive between A and B regardless of information they
have learned on the prior probability of outcomes, on sample size, or
on other important criteria.18 6 Lawyers therefore may use both the
recognition and representative heuristics in analyzing novel situations,
181. See McFADDEN, supra note 112, at 183 ("We are all taught from the beginning
of law school, judges and lawyers alike, that precedent matters, that precedent
binds.").
182. Amos Tverksy & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 38, 55
(Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond, eds., 1986); see also Mullins, supra note 174,
at 51.
183. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 182, at 39.
184. See infra notes 204-235 and accompanying text.
185. Mullins, supra note 174, at 51.
186. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 182, at 39-46 (analyzing also that the
representative heuristic can lead to the gambler's fallacy in which individuals believe
that the future occurrence of a chance event is affected by the event's run in the past);
see also DAMER, supra note 137, at 159-61 (describing the gambler's fallacy).
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but other principles of logical thinking that are prototypical of think-
ing like a lawyer would minimize the negative effects of the use of these
heuristics.
b. Determining Relevance Once Rules Are Known
Once legal thinkers discover the relevant rules, they must engage
in further determinations of relevance. From this starting point, Ste-
phen Burton offers some general suggestions for determining rele-
vance, a process he describes as involving the "judgment of
importance." 1 7 Burton's first principle for determining relevance is to
analyze the purpose of the rule at issue.' 88 This principle follows from
learning theory generally because studies of learning have found that
knowing the purpose behind a rule helps an individual understand the
rule and know how to apply it. ' 8 9 This principle, however, involves the
lawyer's substantive understanding of the doctrine at issue more than
a specific cognitive process the lawyer must undertake.
His second principle more directly pertains to a cognitive process.
He opines that lawyers determine relevance by considering the lan-
guage of the rule at issue and tying particular facts to particular parts
of the rule, such as the elements or factors of the rule.' 90 If any part of
the rule is vague or ambiguous, lawyers can return to the purpose of
the rule to clarify the part's meaning.' 9 ' Within Burton's second prin-
ciple lie the following two additional cognitive components of thinking
like a lawyer.
2. Dissecting Thought
The first related cognitive skill is summarized by Thomas Reed
Powell as "learning to think like a lawyer is when you learn to think
about one thing that is connected to another without thinking about
the other thing that it is connected to."'1 9 2 Lawyers thus develop the
187. BURTON, supra note 4, at 98. Burton discusses the example of determining
what facts are relevant to a hypothetical situation where a child was run over by a
truck. Without the restriction of relevance, questions as diverse as "what religion was
the child" and "was it nighttime or daytime" could appear equally important. See id. at
99-100.
188. Id. at 100-101. Burton also discusses how legal thinkers analyze the situation
when the law appears to have multiple, conflicting purposes. Id. at 124-34.
189. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 213-14.
190. See BURTON, supra note 4, at 101.
191. See id. at 102.
192. A. Simpleman, Jr., Sentimental Metaphors, 34 UCLA L. REV. 537, 545 (1986),
quoted in Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 78 (1986) (Souter, J. , dissenting). In his
dissenting opinion in Montana, Justice Souter quoted Thomas Reed Powell to suggest
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cognitive ability to dissect thought and separate ideas into component
parts that may or may not relate to one another.
193
This process of dissection is most apparent when lawyers scruti-
nize the component parts of a rule. Often those component parts may
be clearly defined, such as in well-drafted statutory sections' 94 or in
well-developed common law rules. 195 Lawyers however, must be pre-
pared to break down rules even when precedent has not clearly done
so.' 96 This process of "elementizing" or "deconstructing" rules pro-
ceeds as lawyers read the language of a rule and separate into a distinct
component each portion of the rule that could become a distinct issue
depending on the facts of the case. 197 In this process, the lawyer looks
for any word or phrase in a rule that may or may not be satisfied by the
facts in a given situation.
For instance, a standard definition of assault reads: "An assault
occurs where the defendant intentionally causes the plaintiff to be rea-
sonably in apprehension of an imminent, offensive touching."' ' In
elementizing this rule, the lawyer sees that several words could give
rise to issues and therefore constitute discrete components in the rule.
By emphasizing these words, the components become apparent: "An
assault occurs where the defendant intentionally causes the plaintiff to
be reasonably in apprehension of an imminent, offensive touching."
Thus, based on the language of this rule, to prove an assault the plain-
tiff would have to demonstrate that: (1) the defendant intended to
cause the plaintiff to be in apprehension; (2) the plaintiff, as opposed
that although lawyers might have this ability, the state might argue that jurors do not
and that they therefore would be confused by admitting evidence on culpable mental
state but not on capacity. Montana, 518 U.S. at 78.
193. RAMY, supra note 13, at 76 (reasoning that "[olne aspect of thinking like a
lawyer is breaking larger ideas down into their constituent parts").
194. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2003) (breaking down into
separate provisions the specific situations when a lawyer must withdraw from
representing a client and the specific situations when a lawyer may withdraw from
such representation).
195. For instance, perhaps the most well-known common law rule is the rule of
negligence, which has four component elements: duty, breach, causation, and harm/
damages.
196. See L.H. LARuE, GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 10 (2d ed.
2001).
197. BRIAN N. SIEGEL & LAZAR EMANUEL, SIEGEL'S ESSAY AND MULTIPLE-CHOICE
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (1998) (defining "elementizing" as
"reducing the legal theories and rules... down to a concise, straightforward statement
of their essential elements"); SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 149-56 (devoting extended
discussion to how legal thinkers must learn to "deconstruct" rules).
198. SIEGEL & EMANUEL, supra note 197, at 5.
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to someone else, was in apprehension; (3) the plaintiffs reaction rose
to the level of "apprehension"; (4) the apprehension was of a touching;
(5) such touching was imminent; and (6) such touching was offensive.
This elementization is not intended to reflect accurately all the issues
that arise in proving assault.' 9 9 Nevertheless, this process of dissect-
ing thought, here in the form of rule elementization, is the first step
legal thinkers take as they seek to understand the rule in order to solve
the legal problem.
3. Perceiving Ambiguity
In the process of dissecting thought, lawyers are looking for words
or phrases that could give rise to issues, and often such words or
phrases point to issues because they are vague or ambiguous. Legal
thinking thus involves the cognitive process of perceiving ambiguity,
often in situations where a nonlawyer might not. Lawyers have in fact
been called "professionals of ambiguity."200 For instance, part of
thinking like a lawyer includes developing the skill to question when
terms are not as well-defined as they purport to be.20 1 Similarly, legal
thinking often involves challenging what others see as intuitively cor-
rect.2°2 One third-year student in the Regent survey challenged this
aspect of legal thinking as positive; he wrote that legal thinking
involves "turn[ing] every conceivable absolute into an uncertainty."
199. Indeed, one could separately identify sub-issues in element (1) in the text. See,
e.g., JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 3-7 (2000) (discussing the legal
definition of intent).
200. LARUE, supra note 196, at 11.
201. I highlight this skill in an apple exercise I use during academic orientation for
entering students at Regent University School of Law. In the exercise, I ask a student
to describe an apple, which I hold before him or her. When the student describes the
apple as "red," we use "red" as a rule for apples that we apply to later objects I present
before them. When I present objects that. are not as "red" as apples, this presentation
invites a discussion on the fact that the word "red" is vague because it may or may not
include colors ranging from melon to maroon. I adapted the exercise from a fruit
exercise I learned from Carol Wilson, the Director of the Academic Support Program
at the University of San Francisco School of Law.
202. In Saunders and Levine's study, one student underscored this point by noting:
IT]he job of a lawyer and the thinking process is much more subtle than I
thought it was .... [Ylou take what is intuitive and you destroy it. Everyone
may understand something on an intuitive level, but you can somehow, by
being persistent and by always bringing up these very strange examples or
strange exceptions to the rule, you can take what was once understood on an
intuitive level and make it suspect.
Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 174.
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This negative extreme of this form of thinking is why legal thinkers
should perceive ambiguity, not manufacture it.
Resources designed to prepare students for law school emphasize
the importance of "interpretation" to legal thinking.2 °3 Law students
learn that words can have many different interpretations and that
words or terms that are even defined in the statute or relevant legal
document can still suffer from ambiguity or vagueness.20 4 Legal defi-
nitions may narrow the scope of the interpretive problem, but they do
not solve it if any of the terms in the definition themselves are either
vague or ambiguous.20 5 As one scholar notes, "Eventually, you
exhaust the rules and definitions that purport to determine which
argument in a case is a correct one by deduction. ' 20 6 At that point,
legal thinkers must rely on extralogical principles of judgment to help
them apply the rules to the case at hand.20 7 Drawing upon such prin-
ciples is important because legal thinkers are problem solvers, so after
their recognition of ambiguity, they still need to discern the best inter-
pretation in order to find the best solution.20 8
Law students must "[ljearn to love the grey," state Ruta K. Stropus
and Charlotte D. Taylor in their popular guide to preparing for law
school, Bridging the Gap Between College and Law School: Strategies for
Success.2 °9 Vague or ambiguous terms in legal rules serve as the focal
points for significant controversies in the law 210 and therefore serve as
key analytical issues in law school.2 11 Resources on legal thinking
203. BURTON, supra note 4, at 52.
204. See id. at 52-53 (noting that words that have two or more meanings are
"ambiguous" whereas words that have meanings that move continuously from one to
another without a clear demarcation are "vague").
205. See id. at 53.
206. Id. at 55.
207. Id.
208. Cf. Daniel Barnett, Associate Professor, Boston College Law School, Remarks
as part of a Panel Presentation at the 2005 LSAC Annual Meeting and Education
Conference entitled, Who Are Our Successful Students? (June 4, 2005) (observing that
successful law students are able to appreciate and make the most of the fact that the
study of law is in between the hard sciences where there generally are right answers
and the humanities where there generally are no right answers).
209. STROPUS & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 13.
210. See, e.g., Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Iowa 1979) (LeGrand, J.,
dissenting) (debating the meaning of the word "tort" in the principle that a
commission of a tort by one spouse against another destroys the defense of spousal
immunity); United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 548-49 (7th Cir. 1979) (considering the
meaning of the term "conspiracy" in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)).
211. For instance, take the classic "reasonable person" standard of duty of care in
negligence. The standard is so general that further tests, or rules, have been developed
to help lawyers apply the standard to particular factual situations and even the
456 [Vol. 29:413
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thus discuss the significance of the fallacy of equivocation to help law-
yers and law students recognize and avoid such flawed reasoning.212
C. Logical Reasoning
1. Deductive and Inductive Reasoning
As noted above, logical thinking in the legal context involves linear
thought.213 More specifically, however, such thinking involves particu-
lar logical thought processes. Only a handful of law school texts
addresses in depth the relationship between legal reasoning and logi-
cal reasoning.214 Nearly all of the texts focus on the following basic
principles of logic as they relate to legal reasoning:
1) inductive reasoning, particular analogical reasoning, inductive gen-
eralizations, and the associated fallacies; and
2) deductive reasoning, particularly categorical, hypothetical, disjunc-
tive, and conjuctive syllogisms and the associated fallacies.215
In many respects, these texts' discussion of these logical princi-
ples does not differ from how they might be discussed in a general
logic text. The question therefore remains whether these principles
have any unique import in legal thinking as opposed to critical think-
ing generally.
On this issue, Judge Ruggero Aldisert underscores in his well-
known text Logic for Lawyers the preeminence of analogical reasoning
to legal thinking.2 6 He writes, "The importance of legal reasoning by
analogy cannot be overstated. It is the heart of the study of law; it lies
at the heart of the Socratic method in the classroom and the court-
room."2 17 In contrast, Douglas Lind in his text Logic and Legal Reason-
application of those tests is not clear in most cases. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note
199, at 51-63 (discussing the different tests applicable in the reasonable person
standard).
212. See, e.g., ALDISERT, supra note 117, at 217-19 ("When we confuse several
meanings of a word or phrase, we use the word or phrase equivocally. When we do
this in the context of an argument, we commit the fallacy of equivocation.").
213. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
214. Many of the books that address the relationship between logic and legal
reasoning are geared expressly for pre-law students or for entering law students. See,
e.g., BURTON, supra note 4; ELIAS E. SAVELLOS & RICHARD F. GALVIN, REASONING AND THE
LAW: THE ELEMENTS (2001).
215. See, e.g., ALDISERT, supra note 117, at xii-xviii; LIND, supra note 140, at ix-xiv;
BURTON, supra note 4, at 25 (contending that "[liegal reasoning takes two principal
forms: One is analogical; the other is deductive").
216. Aldisert is the former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. ALDISERT, supra note 117, at v.
217. Id. at 96. Aldisert adds:
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ing stresses that no one logical process is more important than the
other because analogy, inductive generalization, and deductive logic all
are critical to legal reasoning.21 8
Other texts that address legal reasoning more generally affirm
that the thought processes related both to inductive and deductive rea-
soning are fundamental to legal reasoning, but most support Aldisert's
conclusion by focusing on the importance of inductive reasoning, par-
ticularly analogical reasoning. 219 For instance, in their popular text to
prepare students for law school, Law School Without Fear: Strategies for
Success, Helene and Marshall Shapo note the importance of inductive
and deductive reasoning, but they devote extended discussion to
inductive thought processes.220 The text's emphasis on analogical rea-
soning underscores skills such as being able to distinguish cases.22 1
Other texts similarly stress analogical reasoning even though they
may not use the nomenclature "analogical reasoning" per se. For
instance, in his book, A Student's Guide to Legal Analysis: Thinking Like
a Lawyer, Patrick McFadden contends that in legal analysis students
primarily take on an "archaeological perspective" by reading cases and
discussing what happened in those cases in the past. 22 2 He observes,
however, that students learn how to "switch" perspectives and assume
"contemporary" perspectives so that they can analyze how the cases
It is important for professors to use the Socratic method, because the method
of analogy goes to the fundamentals of the common-law tradition. Cardozo
has taught us that "[tihe common law does not work from pre-established
truths of universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them
deductively. Its method is inductive and it draws from generalizations to
particulars."
Id. (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 22-23
(1921)). Law professors' use of hypothetical illustrations in the classroom particularly
develops students' skills in analogical reasoning. See HELENE SHAPO & MARSHALL
SHAPO, LAW SCHOOL WITHOUT FEAR: STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS 69 (2d ed. 2002).
218. LIND, supra note 140, at 21.
219. See, e.g., BRAND & WHITE, supra note 3, at 142 ("Analogies are a vital mode of
arguing in the legal context.").
220. SHAPO & SHAPO, supra note 217, at 59. These authors define inductive and
deductive reasoning as based on whether the reasoning moves from the particular to
the general or from the general to the particular. Id. Strictly speaking, the two forms
differ in the extent to which the premises are claimed to prove the conclusion. In
deductive reasoning, the conclusion is claimed to follow necessarily from its premises;
that is, the premises are intended to make the conclusion inevitable. In inductive
reasoning, the conclusion is claimed to follow from its premises only with some degree
of probability (e.g., that the conclusion is probably true). See LIND, supra note 140, at
7; IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 24-26 (10th ed. 1998).
221. Id. at 66-67.
222. McFADDEN, supra note 112, at 14.
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would apply to modern situations.223 For students to compare the
cases with the current situations, they must employ principles of ana-
logical reasoning even though McFadden does not use that particular
phrase to describe the process.224
These texts' emphasis is understandable given that law students
and lawyers spend a considerable amount of time comparing the fac-
tual situation before them (whether it be hypothetical or real) to ones
in cases where controlling or persuasive authority has been set. 225
Accordingly, respondents rated "identifying similarities and differ-
ences between cases and problems" as a highly important skill in the
LSAC study referenced above.226 Law professors must similarly believe
that analogical reasoning is central to thinking like a lawyer because
they often spend class time challenging the students to apply the rule
from an assigned case to a class hypothetical. In this process, students
are forced to draw analogies between the hypothetical and the read
case.
In contrast to analogical reasoning, the other primary form of
inductive reasoning, inductive generalizations, is much less empha-
sized in the legal reasoning texts. Some texts, in fact, omit it altogether
and focus solely on deductive reasoning and analogical reasoning.22 r
Scholars may overlook inductive generalizations because they believe
that lawyers do not induce new law because that is the role of judges
or congressional bodies. 228 However, this oversight is problematic
because lawyers often engage in such reasoning through their process
of "synthesizing cases. '229 Numerous theorists describe this process
of synthesis as critical to legal thinking.230 In this process, which is
related to lawyers' search for coherence, lawyers examine multiple
223. Id.
224. Id. at 14-15.
225. Id. at 66-67; see also SAVELLOS & GALVIN, supra note 214, at 69; (emphasizing
the relevance of analogical reasoning to case analysis); LAUREL CURRIE OATES ET AL.,
THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK: ANALYSIS, RESEARCH, AND WRITING 61 (2d ed. 1998)
(providing a chart on how to present arguments based on analogous cases).
226. LSAC Study, supra note 54, at 12.
227. BURTON, supra note 4 (devoting entire chapters to "deductive reasoning" and
"analogical reasoning" while not mentioning inductive generalizations).
228. Cf. LIND, supra note 140, at 20-21 (describing how judges employ principles of
inductive generalizations when they "begin to speak of a 'general rule"').
229. Id. at 62.
230. McFADDEN, supra note 112, at xvi, 172 (observing how legal thinking requires
one to see the "forest" and not just the "trees" and how the legal principle of
"coherence" requires one to fit together related cases, statutes, and other sources of
law).
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cases to find certain "common threads among them."' 231 Similarly,
they look to rules to find linkages among them.232 Through these tech-
niques, lawyers often induce new general principles that they, in turn,
seek to apply to the case at hand.
Of the sources that emphasize the importance of deductive rea-
soning to legal argumentation, many focus on the categorical syllogism
as the paramount framework for legal analysis.233 This classical
deductive thought process finds particular application in the lawyers'
task of applying generalized legal principles to specific facts of the
case. Some scholars have viewed this application skill as central to
what it means to "think like a lawyer. ' 234 In Legal Argument: The
Structure and Language of Effective Advocacy, James Gardner asserts
that his thesis is that "all legal argument should be in the form of [cate-
gorical] syllogisms. '235 He advances his theory not so much to high-
light what legal reasoning requires as much as to contend what
persuasive legal argumentation should entail.236
Despite this focus on the categorical form of deductive reasoning,
hypothetical syllogisms also play a role in legal thinking. In fact, cer-
tain premises in a categorical syllogism can be transformed into hypo-
thetical ("if-then") statements to show the causal relationship between
the two terms in the premise and help the reader better understand the
rules at issue.237 Seeing these statements in a causal form is relevant
231. Id.; see also STROPUS & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 53-63 (devoting an entire
chapter to the topic of synthesis). In their study of law students, Saunders and Levine
reported that several law students recounted how case synthesis was an important skill
to thinking like a lawyer. Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 167.
232. LARUE, supra note 196, at 9.
233. See, e.g., id. at 172 ("In the kingdom of law, the syllogism reigns supreme.").
The classic example of a categorical syllogism is: "All men are mortal; Socrates is a
man; Therefore, Socrates is mortal." ALDISERT, supra note 117, at 39.
234. See, e.g., University of Montana School of Law, Law Insider, available at http://
www.umt.edu/LAWINSIDER/class/burnham/facts/slide56.html (last visited Sept. 8,
2006) (defining thinking like a lawyer as "the ability to analyze the interplay of law
and fact").
235. GARDNER, supra note 122, at 3.
236. Id. at 4 (claiming that "[slyllogistic argument provides the requisite appearance
of certainty" and "makes the outcome of a case seem as certain and as mechanical as
the output of a mathematical equation").
237. For instance, the classic premise "All men are mortal" can be transformed into
"If X is a man, then X is mortal." See SAVELLOS & GALVIN, supra note 214, at 16-17, 63;
DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & CHRISTINA L. KUNZ: LEGAL READING, REASONING, AND
WRITING 12-18 (1999) (encouraging readers to transform legal rules into "if/then"
statements so that they can better understand and apply those rules).
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to legal thinking because causal reasoning is independently relevant in
many areas of the law where issues of causation are pivotal.2 38
In sum, although many texts emphasize one form over the other,
lawyers engage in both inductive and deductive forms of thinking in
their problem solving. The two traditional forms of legal analysis, rea-
soning from statutes and from cases, both utilize deductive and induc-
tive processes. Reasoning from statutes is often viewed as the
archetype for deductive reasoning,239 but for instance, the entire juris-
prudential area of statutory interpretation involves inductive thought
processes. 240 Edward Levi's "classic" conception of reasoning from
cases also involves both deductive and inductive forms.24 1 In his work,
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, he provides the following explana-
tion for reasoning from cases:
238. For instance, criminal law and tort law, particularly the law of negligence, are
especially concerned with issues of causation.
239. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 4, at 43 ("Legal reasoning in the deductive form is
most closely associated with reasoning from enacted law, which usually consists of
general rules.").
240. For instance, in their casebook on legislation, William Eskridge and Philip
Frickey discuss how statutory interpretation may involve discerning the purpose of a
statute. To discern such a purpose, they offer the theory of Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks as one approach to discerning such purpose: "[Ildentify instances where the
statute unquestionably applies, and ... use these points of reference (1) to shed light
on the overall purpose of the statute and (2) to resolve close cases by reasoning by
analogy from the unquestionable applications." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY 576 (1988) (citing HENRY HART AND ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1157 (tent. ed. 1958)); cf. SAVELLOS
& GALVIN, supra note 214, at 73-74 (discussing general analytical processes involved
in statutory interpretation). Burton specifically identifies the following as sources of
information to use in interpreting a statute:
(1) the ordinary meanings of the words of an enactment, (2) judicial
precedents applying the same enacted rule, (3) noncontroversial hypothetical
cases, (4) cases or situations governed by other rules in the same enactment,
(5) historical events or situations linked to the enactment, (6) contemporary
economic and social practices at the time of enactment, and (7) the legislative
history.
BURTON, supra note 4, at 73. A paradigmatic Supreme Court case that evidences the
inductive aspects of statutory interpretation is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). In the case, which is discussed in several books on legal
reasoning, the Court analyzed legislative history and events at the time of the statute's
passage to determine its applicability to the situation at issue. Id. at 463, construed in,
e.g., BURTON, supra note 4, at 70-73.
241. See Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
517, 523 (1998) (calling Levi's work as the "classic" work on legal reasoning).
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It is a three-step process described by the doctrine of precedent in
which a proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of
law and then applied to a next similar situation. The steps are these:
similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the
first case is announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the
second case.2 4 2
In this form, inductive reasoning predominates in the first two steps
through the form of analogical reasoning and inductive generalization.
Then, deductive reasoning predominates in the third step as the rule is
applied to the case at hand. 43
The flowchart in the Appendix therefore recognizes both forms.
The syllogistic form is central to legal reasoning; and legal thinkers,
whether they consciously recognize it or not, proceed through the form
of a categorical syllogism to prove whether their legal conclusion is
valid. The Appendix represents the deductive form as operating when
the lawyer determines the rule that forms the major premise for the
categorical syllogism applicable in the particular case.
As Elias Savellos and Richard Galvin contend, inductive thought
processes come before and during this deductive form at several
stages. They call deductive reasoning a "late comer" in the legal rea-
soning process:
The application of the syllogistic deductive model of judicial reasoning
presupposes that the court has (i) identified the legally relevant facts of
the case, (ii) determined exactly which legal rule applies to that case,
and (iii) determined how that legal rule applies to those facts. Obvi-
ously the distinctive features of judicial reasoning involve determining
the relevant facts, determining the appropriate rule, and fitting the rule
to the facts (almost anyone could do the simple modus penens if all of
this was in place). But none of these distinctive aspects of legal reason-
ing involves the deductive model itself.
24 4
This understanding contrasts with problem solving in many non-
legal contexts where once one decides upon the rule to apply, the
application is straightforward. However, for lawyers, as L.H. LaRue
contends, "rules don't end arguments; they start arguments. ' 24 5 Rules
in the legal context often only begin an analytical process because
many rules are so broad that their application in all contexts is not
clear.2 46
242. EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1949).
243. Cf. SAVELLOS & GALVIN, supra note 214, at 77-78.
244. Id. at 63.
245. LARUE, supra note 196, at 4.
246. See id. at 5 (contrasting most legal rules with rules like the speed limit, of
which the application is usually clear).
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The Appendix therefore recognizes that inductive processes arise
in determining: (1) the facts that are relevant to identifying the perti-
nent rule; (2) the content of the rule (the major premise of the syllo-
gism) when the rule must be synthesized from multiple sources; and
(3) the facts that are relevant to determining the content of the minor
premise.247
2. The Limits of Logical Thinking
As the above discussion demonstrates, principles of logical rea-
soning are critical to thinking like a lawyer. Legal thinking, however,
involves more processes than can be explained by logic alone, whether
it be by formal deductive processes or more informal inductive
processes. Legal thinking can properly be said to "include" logical rea-
soning but not be "exhausted by" such reasoning.24 8
First, much of the logical thinking in the legal context involves
inductive forms. Inductive logic, by definition, can never categorically
prove the validity of the conclusions of an argument. 249 Thus, princi-
ples of judgment, apart from pure logical concerns, determine whether
or not a legal argument is a good one. For instance, principles of statu-
tory construction, whether one is construing the meaning of a term or
discerning legislative intent, do not involve only principles of logic.2 50
More importantly, although analogical reasoning is central to
legal thinking, it only provides the "method" such thinkers are employ-
ing when they compare the case at hand to other decisions.25' The
heart of analogical reasoning in a legal context goes to which decisions
are relevant and, more specifically, which facts in those decisions are
247. Cf. SAVELLOS & GALVIN, supra note 214, at 63. As the Appendix reflects, more
than one rule may be applicable in a resolving a legal problem. In elementizing the
rule, each element of the rule may become the major premise in its own categorical
syllogism. Also, the problem may be polysyllogistic such that the legal thinker will
need to go through multiple syllogisms to reach the ultimate conclusion. See ALDISERT,
supra note 117, at 64 ("A polysyllogism is a series of syllogisms in which the
conclusion of one is the premise of the next."); see also Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada,
Inc. v. Hodel, 856 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1988) (analyzing a polysyllogism in
one of the parties' arguments). Cf. SAVELLOS & GALVIN, supra note 214, at 63.
248. SAVELLOS & GALVIN, supra note 214, at 82; see also BURTON, supra note 4, at 57
("Like analogical reasoning from cases, deductive legal reasoning from rules has its
uses and abuses. Good lawyers and judges neither accept these forms nor reject them
as forms. They use them to benefit from their strengths and supplement them to
avoid their weaknesses.").
249. LIND, supra note 140, at 9; see also supra note 220.
250. SAVELLOS & GALVIN, supra note 214, at 82-83; see also BURTON, supra note 4, at
55-56 (discussing the analytical process of determining legislative intent).
251. SAVELLOS & GALVIN, supra note 214, at 82.
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relevantly similar.252 Scholars have recognized this notion in applying
logical reasoning to the law. H.L.A. Hart addressed this issue in his
seminal work The Concept of Law:
[T]hough "Treat like cases alike and different cases differently" is a
central element in the idea of justice, it is by itself incomplete and,
until supplemented, cannot afford any determinate guide to
conduct....
[U]ntil it is established what resemblances and differences are relevant,
"Treat like cases alike" must remain an empty form. To fill it we must
know when, for the purposes in hand, cases are to be regarded as alike
and what differences are relevant.2 53
Determining relevance is guided by rules of logic, but it is not pre-
scribed by them. The sections below discuss other areas where legal
thinking goes beyond pure principles of logic.
D. Arguing from the Rules
Underlying much of the above discussion is an emphasis on rules;
indeed, a fundamental aspect of legal reasoning is the preeminence of
"rules" of law.254 From the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, to Jewish
law, to Greek and Roman law, the Western conception of law devel-
oped from a strong rule-based heritage.255 Modern legal philosophers
have challenged this rule-based conception of law. They have asserted,
among other things, that the rule-based approach is merely a fagade
because how rules are applied to facts reflects the power of the deci-
sionmaker, not the sanctity of rules.2 5 6 Nevertheless, as Patrick
252. Cf. id. at 82; BURTON, supra note 4, at 40 (asserting that analogical reasoning
in the law requires three steps: "identifying an authoritative base point, or precedent;
(2) identifying factual similarities and differences between the precedent and the
problem case; and (3) judging whether the factual similarities or the differences are
more important").
253. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155 (1961).
254. Not one precise definition exists of what is meant by a legal "rule." Surveying
different definitions, however, leads to a family of characteristics that describe the
term. For instance, Burton describes rules as those provisions that "designate classes
of cases and affix legal consequences to membership in those classes." BURTON, supra
note 4, at 97. Savellos and Galvin define legal rules more broadly as "statement[s] of
legal requirement(s) in a given set of circumstances." SAVELLOS & GALVIN, supra note
214, at 72. To decrease the circularity of their definition, "of legal requirement(s)"
could be replaced with "of law that imposes requirements."
255. MCFADDEN, supra note 112, at 186.
256. Id. at 186; see also JEFFREY A. BRAUCH, Is HIGHER LAW COMMON LAw? READINGS
ON THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 86 (1999)
(discussing the critical legal studies movement and its view that law is simply designed
to perpetuate power structures). Even such philosophers recognize, however, that legal
[Vol. 29:413464
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McFadden responds, such challenges are "meta-critiques" that criticize
an underlying assumption of the American system. 25 7 They come
from "outside" the system and do not affect what lawyers and judges
do "inside" the system. Regardless of whether one believes that law is
merely a mask for power, the lawyer working inside the system will still
file with the court briefs and memoranda that cite the respective con-
trolling authorities.258 Moreover, such skeptical approaches to law are
largely unhelpful to law students and practicing lawyers who are faced
with legal authority that binds them in the instance at issue. As Ste-
phen Burton observes, "[Hiow can a genuine skeptic function as an
effective lawyer if legal reasoning cannot be relied on to connect law
with official action? 25
9
Books designed to prepare students for law school emphasize the
primacy of rules in legal thought. In his Guide to the Study of Law: An
Introduction, L.H. LaRue begins by discussing how lawyers' arguments
relate to rules. 260 He notes that nonlawyers customarily argue "about"
rules in arguing whether the rules are good rules. 26 1 LaRue contends
that lawyers, in contrast, spend most of their time "arguing from
within rules. 262 He adds that lawyers are normally obliged to take the
rules and argue for a particular result based on the application of those
rules.263 Other scholars have emphasized the importance of rules by
contending that the legal rules are what link the facts in a situation to
the legal conclusion.264 Students in the Regent survey further con-
thinkers must be able to understand and work with rules in the legal structure. See
Duncan Kennedy's endorsement of the book Getting to Maybe: How to Excel on Law
School Exams by Richard Michael Fischl and Jeremy Paul. In the endorsement,
Kennedy contends that the book, which discusses arguing from the rules, will help law
students "think like a lawyer." FISCHL & PAUL, supra note 116, at back cover.
257. McFADDEN, supra note 112, at 186.
258. Id. at 186-87.
259. BURTON, supra note 4, at 3.
260. LARUE, supra note 196, at 3.
261. Id. For instance, LaRue observes that even little children develop the skill of
arguing whether the rules for bedtime are good rules and that political argument is
customarily about what kinds of laws (or rules) government should adopt. Id.
262. Id. at 3-4.
263. Id. He further notes that law schools therefore focus on training students to
argue from within the system by taking a rule and applying it to the facts in a
particular case. Id.
264. BRAND & WHITE, supra note 3, at 141. These authors represent this
relationship visually by the following chart:
Legal Theory
Fact > Conclusion
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firmed how thinking like a lawyer involves an emphasis on working
with "rules."
265
This focus on rules relates to other issues surrounding the legal
concept of authority.266 First, in arguing from the rules, legal thinkers
are concerned with whether those rules come from a source that is
binding or merely persuasive in the particular jurisdiction governing
the resolution of the problem at issue.267 This emphasis on rules also
reflects the traditional notion of judicial deference. Law students are
taught in the beginning of their legal education the principle of stare
decisis, "that precedent binds. ' 268 They are also taught the related
principles of judicial deference in which judges defer to legislative
enactments like constitutions and statutes.269 In fact, these instances
of judicial deference are only two examples of a pervasive principle
under which judges are constantly being asked to defer to other bod-
ies.270 Even in decisions seen as judicially activist, judges point to
authority to support their decision; they do not proceed whimsically
without justifying their departure from previous decisions.271
265. For instance, one third-year student wrote, "I find myself in everyday life now
searching for the 'rule."'
266. BRAND & WHITE, supra note 3, at 141, 145.
267. See SAVELLOS & GALVIN, supra note 214, at 64-65.
268. McFADDEN, supra note 112, at 183 ("We are all taught from the beginning of
law school, judges and lawyers alike, that precedent matters, that precedent binds.");
see also BURTON, supra note 4, at 115.
269. MCFADDEN, supra note 112, at 182-83.
270. Deference occurs not only through case precedent and legislative enactments
but also with other branches of government. For instance, the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution instructs states to defer to the federal government in certain cases.
Id. at 183-84.
271. See James M. Boland, Constitutional Legitimacy and the Culture Wars: Rule of
Law or Dictatorship of a Shifting Supreme Court Majority?, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 245, 287-
91 (2005-06) (discussing the authority the Supreme Court presented in changing the
law of segregation in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). McFadden
also presents several arguments in support of the import of judicial deference:
In most cases, of course, there will be someone on the other side calling for
intervention and judicial action. But there is a great deal of argument arrayed
on the side of deference: the principle of legality; a tradition of liberalism that
seeks constantly to expand the boundaries of acceptable behavior; and a set
of constitutional freedoms-of religion, association, and speech-that (in
addition to their technical legal content) reflect a spirit of tolerance. All of
this presses on judges, urging them to bend to the will of others, to refrain
from interfering without the most substantial reasons for doing so.
McFADDEN, supra note 112, at 185.
466 [Vol. 29:413
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This principle of deference is related to the foundational principle
of the "rule of law"'272 and is so wedded to our legal system that it is
part of thinking like a lawyer. Classic legal thinking can involve argu-
ing that the applicability of a rule in a particular situation leads to an
unjust result, but the importance of the rule of law underscores the
presumption that the laws are enforceable and are not merely "guide-
lines or presumptions. 273
This emphasis on authority and deference contrasts with logical
thinking generally. For instance, in pure logic, one is not bound to
follow an argument once the logical flaw in that argument is
revealed.274 In a legal context, if a lawyer believes that a judicial deci-
sion is illogical, the lawyer may point out the logical flaw to the court.
Nevertheless, if the decision carries precedential weight in the particu-
lar jurisdiction at issue, the lawyer must argue "within the rule" by
contending that his position is justifiable when the rule of the deci-
sion, however illogical, is applied to the particular case.275
This emphasis on authority and deference also gives rise to the
tension that may exist at times between enforcing laws and promoting
broader principles of justice. Lawyers hesitate in arguing that higher
principles trump a straightforward application of the rule because
traditional legal thinking holds "the belief that the too-easy escape
from rules, even in just one case, does systematic harm to the legal
process.276
Lawyers' fascination with rules, however, is apparent even in their
appeals to justice. Such appeals are presented as appeals to other
rules, such as the higher rules associated with moral truth, including
natural law.2 77 Lawyers argue the applicability of rules based on other
rules. They generally do not argue for a particular result by attacking
272. SAVELLOS & GALVIN, supra note 214, at 71 (defining the phrase "rule of law" as
"the objective and principled settlement of disputes via the employment of a stable
system of laws"); see also BURTON, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing the relevance of the
"rule of law" to legal study).
273. See MCFADDEN, supra note 112, at 187 (recognizing that, although the "spirit of
the times" might favor a soft interpretation or rules, the American government is a
government "of laws not of men").
274. See SAVELLOS & GALVIN, supra note 214, at 82.
275. Cf. id. at 82 (adding that the principle of stare decisis creates a "duty" for
judges to follow binding precedent even though the judge believes the prior decision is
incorrect). Savellos and Galvin's recognition of such a duty, however, does not
preclude the fact that judges seek to distinguish such controlling precedent or may
point to problematic aspects of a prior ruling in seeking to apply it.
276. MCFADDEN, supra note 112, at 188.
277. See, e.g., U.S. v. Lynch, No. 96-6137, 1996 WL 717912, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 11,
1996) (considering defendant's argument that an injunction was improper because it
20071 467
55
Gantt: Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer: Analyzing the Cognitive Co
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2007
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:413
the rule per se but by contending that the rule should be applied in a
particular way based on another rule that affects its application.
278
For instance, lawyers may contend that determining whether an indi-
vidual is negligent should be limited by broader rules providing the
rationale for the negligence standard in the first place.279 In sum,
belief in the "sanctity of rules" is a hallmark of traditional legal
thinking.28 °
E. Seeing All Sides
Scholars emphasize that another component of legal reasoning,
and therefore of "thinking like a lawyer," is the skill of being able to
analyze an issue from the perspective of various parties. 281 For
instance, lawyers in a litigation context should be able to see an issue
not only from their client's perspective, but also from the perspective
of the other parties, the judge, and the jurors.282
violated natural law, as illustrated by Pope John Paul II's encyclical Evangelium Vitae
and Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica).
278. See LARUE, supra note 196, at 12. LaRue specifically breaks down legal
analysis of rules into "logical calculations," in which (1) lawyers look for the ways
rules are linked together and then break down the rules into their component parts,
and (2) they conduct "extravagant leaps into ambiguity and principle," in which they
look for ambiguity in the rules and then argue for a particular application of the rules
based on other relevant rules. See id. at 9-13.
279. See, e.g., FISCHL & PAUL, supra note 116, at 589-60 (discussing the distinction
between arguing that a case should be decided by the letter of the rule versus the
rationale behind the rule).
280. See McFADDEN, supra note 112, at 186. McFadden adds that law is by nature
conservative because it presumptively assumes that rules developed and applied in the
past should be applied again in the future:
This conservatism is neither politically charged nor optional.... If one starts
with the law, one unavoidably starts with the past, with its structures,
content, and terms of debate. Deciding when to break with the past, when to
stop conserving and begin building, has no easy answer. We can never be
sure that we are right. We can only do our best, as lawyers and judges,
arguing and deciding with all the honesty, intelligence, and even bravery we
can muster.
Id. at 189.
281. Select students in Saunders and Levine's study reported how law school taught
them to argue a position from differing perspectives. Saunders & Levine, supra note
17, at 164. For instance, one student noted that he learned that thinking like a lawyer
included "the ability to influence and take certain facts or circumstances and argue
them in different ways to show that a certain set of facts can come to two different
conclusions . . . [i]nstead of. . . down to one perfect true point." Id.
282. See id. at 193 (reprinting a student essay on "thinking like a lawyer," which
described how lawyers should be able to think from these persons' perspectives).
468
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Studies on law students support these scholars' views. Specifi-
cally, in Saunders and Levine's study of law students' impressions of
what it means to think like a lawyer, the students focused the most on
the skill of being able to see an issue from multiple perspectives. 2 3
These results were confirmed in the Regent survey in which students
stressed this aspect of thinking like a lawyer perhaps more than any
other. For instance, one third-year student wrote, "After three years I
have learned that the answer to every question is 'it depends.' "284
Another third-year student wrote, "Thinking like a lawyer means con-
sidering a problem from every possible angle. 285
This cognitive fluidity is relevant to lawyers' advocacy. From see-
ing various positions, lawyers often do not make arguments in a
283. Id. at 169. Saunders and Levine note how this ability relates to William Perry's
scheme on intellectual and ethical development in which he describes how
individuals, on their way to the final phase of generalized relativism, go through a
phase of multiplism, in which they recognize that there may be various perspectives on
an issue and that others have a right to their opinion. Id. at 136, 168-69 (discussing
WILLIAM G. PERRY, FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL AND ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE COLLEGE
YEARS: A SCHEME (1970)). One student in their study opined that lawyers argue all
sides to the extreme end of challenging everything:
If I were introduced to a woman who was described as someone who "thinks
like a lawyer[,]" . . . I would expect her to play devil's advocate to my every
idea and to follow her own line of logical reasoning to its maddening end.
She would ask me penetrating questions I would rather not answer. She
would counterpoint my every point and ask me one too many "whys?" She
would never allow sleeping dogs to lie or leave any stone unturned,
questioning everything, no matter how much a given I believe it to be. I
would fully expect her to work and prod me until every weak point was
exposed and strength was checked and validated.
Id. at 153 n.113.
284. One result of developing this ability is the tendency for legal thinkers to believe
that there are no absolutes. For instance, in their study, Saunders and Levine reported
how law students recounted that they learned in law school that there is no absolute
right perspective in the law. Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 163-64, 169 n.141,
170, 172, 178. For instance, one student commented: "Here I thought that there was
really an absolute rule a case would come up with but now I know that there isn't [sic]
any absolutes." Id. at 163. Another student commented: "I think before [law school] I
was sort of thinking it was going to be all very black and white .... I think now there
are a lot of answers. You can pretty much make the answer be whatever you want it to
be." Id. at 178. However, being able to see an issue from multiple perspectives does
not equal an abandonment of a belief in absolutes. The rise of the religious lawyering
movement testifies that modern legal thinkers can still believe in absolutes. See, e.g.,
Robert K. Vischer, Heretics in the Temple of Law: The Promise and Perils of the Religious
Lawyering Movement, 19 J.L. & RELIGION 427, 474 (2003-04) (recognizing most
religious lawyers' belief in absolute truth).
285. Being able to argue an issue from multiple perspectives does not mean that
lawyers should do so in every case, just that they have the skill to be able to do so.
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binary, technical way in which legal analysis always leads to nice, clean
"yes or no" responses. They thus are forced to argue in the alternative.
Some writers discuss this skill in persuasive legal writing when law-
yers argue a second alternative theory without admitting that the first
theory is unsound.286 Moreover, being able to recognize and dismiss
reasonable counterarguments to a position is one of the primary char-
acteristics of a good argument in general.28 7
Several students in the Regent survey responded that this aspect
of thinking like a lawyer requires lawyers to process information in a
"non-emotional way," "attempting to remove emotions from the situa-
tion/problem." These responses stress the objectivity that character-
izes legal thinking.2 8 Seeing an issue from multiple perspectives,
however, does not mean that thinking like a lawyer requires that law-
yers emotionally detach themselves from their work. As one Regent
student commented, "Thinking like a lawyer requires you to think with
your brain and your heart." True integrity requires that lawyers con-
template how their personal morality affects their work as a lawyer.
Lawyers may advocate causes with which they personally disagree, but
to maintain their integrity, they must be able to explain why advocat-
ing such causes does not violate their personal moral code.28 9
F. Attending to Detail
Implicit in much of the above discussion is another cognitive skill
lawyers develop: attention to detail. Lawyers, in general, are very
detail oriented.29 ° Scholars have recognized this attention to detail by
286. GARDNER, supra note 122, at 69.
287. DAMER, supra note 137, at 6, 15 (describing the "rebuttal principle," which
holds that "[o]ne who presents an argument for or against a position should attempt to
provide an effective rebuttal to all serious challenges to the argument or the position it
supports and to the strongest argument on the other side of the issue").
288. A student in Saunders and Levine's study similarly opined that lawyers are not
"distracted in [their] thinking by emotions." Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at
171, 92.
289. See Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, Integration as Integrity: Postmodernism, Psychology,
and Religion on the Role of Moral Counseling in the Attorney-Client Relationship, 16
REGENT UNIV. L. REV. 233, 248-51 (2003-04) ("At some level . . . an integrated
individual must be able to justify why... circumstantial changes justify his behavioral
changes. An individual cannot simply be defined by the role, but instead must
maintain a core self across roles."); cf. Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 175 n.145
(reporting a law student's comment on how legal education made her reflect on how it
is difficult for individuals to separate their emotions from their intellectual exercises).
290. Many students in Saunders & Levine's study emphasized that they thought
"attention to detail" was important to thinking like a lawyer. Saunders & Levine,
supra note 17, at 168, 192 (explaining, inter alia, how one student reported that
470 [Vol. 29:413
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contending that any good legal argument is characterized by "preci-
sion. '291 Legal rules and principles consistently make fine distinc-
tions; the use of one word over another or the placement of a particular
punctuation mark may dramatically change the legal import of a
text.292 Legal thinkers thus must recognize those distinctions both to
understand the law and to know how to apply it to a particular factual
scenario.293 Several students in the Regent survey stressed the impor-
tance of precision and detail orientation in legal thinking.294 At the
same time, however, legal thinking involves being able to discern
which distinctions are important and which ones are not.295 Knowing
the import of distinctions is related to the skill noted above regarding
determining relevance.296
Being attendant to detail is intricately linked to how lawyers read.
Although not a cognitive component of thinking, reading is so funda-
mental to acquiring information in the legal context that how lawyers
read relates to how they think.29 7 As one legal scholar observed, "read-
ing is thinking."298 Discussing the fine attributes of legal reading is
"careful and thorough analysis" was an important lawyering skill while another
student described that thinking like a lawyer means to "think precisely" and be able to
"focus on details").
291. See MCFADDEN, supra note 112, at 171.
292. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 12, 99 (noting how a legal conclusion can
depend on how words are defined and how conjunctions and punctuation marks are
used).
293. See McFADDEN, supra note 112, at 171 (observing the fact that the law makes
"all kinds of distinctions"). Indeed, judges and lawyers are continually having to
discern the relevance of fine distinctions of language. For a recent representative case,
see, e.g., Fletcher Hill, Inc. v. Crosbie, 872 A.2d 292 (Vt. 2005) (considering the
distinction among the terms "prevailing party," "substantially prevailing party," and
"successful" in interpreting a fee shifting statute).
294. For instance, one third-year student wrote that to think like a lawyer means, in
part, to "think and talk precisely." Another second-year student wrote that to think
like a lawyer is "for your attention to be drawn to detail and particularly to be able to
spot automatically anything unusual."
295. See McFADDEN, supra note 112, at 171.
296. See supra notes 143-88 and accompanying text. Law students are customarily
first tested on their ability to discern the relevant from irrelevant information when
they face their first essay question on a law school exam. The traditional "issue-
spotter" essay question requires students to assess which facts in the question point to
particular legal issues.
297. One third-year student in the Regent survey, in fact, defined to think like a
lawyer as "to read carefully: every word, comma, period, etc. matters!" See also
SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 11 (reasoning that law students need to develop the skills
of reading with attention to detail).
298. Ruth Ann McKinney, Teach Them to Read, and They'll Read for a Lifetime: Some
Thoughts About How Academic Support Professionals Can "Turn On Light Bulbs" By
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beyond the scope of this article. 299 However, studies of legal reading
illumine that good legal readers are purposeful; they are aware of the
context of their reading as they proceed, and, although detail-oriented,
they do not get mired in the details to the extent of losing sight of the
main ideas in the reading. 300 Thus, lawyers' cognitive orientation to
solve problems affects their cognitive approach to reading; they read
law strategically with the underlying purpose that it is to help them
solve the problem before them.
G. Recognizing the "Big" Issues
In addition to the above cognitive components about how lawyers
process information and solve problems, the question arises whether
thinking like a lawyer necessitates that lawyers recognize how the legal
information they are processing relates to "big" issues, like morality,
ethics, and public policy. 301 On this question, several students in the
Regent survey concluded that thinking like a lawyer involves moral
Effective Reading Strategies, THE LEARNING CURVE, Spring 2005, at 3, 4, available at
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/profiles/glesnerfines/asp/Spring2005Learning
Curve.pdf.
299. For insight on legal reading, see RUTH ANN McKINNEY, READING LIKE A LAWYER
(2005). In McKinney's article, Teach Them to Read, supra note 298, she also cites the
following recommended resources: Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal
Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEG. EDUC.
155 (1999); Scott J. Burnham, Critical Reading of Contracts, 23 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM
391 (1999); Dorothy H. Deegan, Exploring Individual Differences Among Novices
Reading in a Specific Domain: The Case of Law, 30 READING RES. Q. 154 (1995); Peter
Dewitz, Reading Law: Three Suggestions for Legal Education, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 657
(1996); Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking
Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163 (1993); Christina L. Kunz, Teaching First-Year
Contracts Students How to Read and Edit Contract Clauses, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 705
(2003); Mary A. Lundeberg, Metacognitive Aspects of Reading Comprehension: Studying
Understanding in Legal Case Analysis, 22 READING RES. Q. 407 (1987); Laurel Currie
Oates, Beating the Odds: Reading Strategies of Law Students Admitted Through
Alternative Admissions Programs, 83 IowA L. REV. 139 (1997); Michael Hunter
Schwartz, Teaching Law Students to be Self-Regulated Learners, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L.
REV. 447 (2003); James F. Stratman, The Emergence of Legal Composition as a Field of
Inquiry: Evaluating the Prospects, 60 REV. EDUC. RES. 153 (1990).
300. See McKinney, Teach Them to Read, supra note 298, at 4. This principle relates
to the survey result from a second-year Regent student who wrote that to "think like a
lawyer" means "to look at the big picture and still concern yourself with every detail."
301. McFADDEN, supra note 112, at 173 (using the adjective "big" to refer to these
larger concerns). In addition to the "big" concerns noted in the text, lawyers must
consider other non-legal factors the client deems important to solving the client's legal
problems. For instance, clients may emphasize goals as diverse as promoting family
harmony and minimizing financial cost, and lawyers must consider those goals in
solving the legal problems at issue.
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dimensions. For instance, one third-year student wrote, "I think a
good lawyer should always think, 'Am I acting with integrity?' and
always keep justice in mind. 30 2
Conceiving of legal thinking as involving moral considerations is
not unique to students in the Regent survey; in their research on think-
ing like a lawyer, Saunders and Levine discuss extensively how devel-
oping the skill of thinking like a lawyer is linked to moral and ethical
development.30 3 Additionally, regarding public policy, numerous texts
that instruct entering law students on the fundamentals of legal rea-
soning underscore the relevance of public policy to such reasoning.30 4
A functional perspective on law is now so ingrained in legal education
that, in the words of one author writing for law students, policy analy-
sis has become "indispensable. 30
5
The rise of these "extralogical" concerns gives rise to the issue of
how they fit within the other cognitive components of thinking like a
lawyer.30 6 First, although syllogistic thinking forms the structure of
legal reasoning,30 7 logic alone does not inform the content of the prem-
ises in such reasoning. Sometimes the major premises are given, such
as when judges and lawyers are asked to apply a specific statute.30 8 At
302. Another second-year student wrote that to "think like a lawyer" "means that I
must consider ethical issues and consider the best interests of my client as I think
through different issues."
303. For instance, Saunders and Levine devote considerable attention to how law
students' conceptions of thinking like a lawyer relate to William Perry's model of
intellectual and ethical development and Lawrence Kohlberg's theory on the stages of
moral development. See Saunders & Levine, supra note 17, at 135-40. Furthermore,
students in their study discussed the moral and ethical aspects of legal thinking. See
id. at 171. Saunders and Levine do not distinguish between moral and ethical
concerns, and such a distinction is not necessary for purposes of this Article. The
issue is whether legal thinking involves matters beyond the law itself (as defined by
statutory and common law rules).
304. See, e.g., HUHN, supra note 2, at 51-68 (discussing policy arguments as one of
the "five types of legal arguments"); SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 13-14.
305. McFADDEN, supra note 112, at 178.
306. I prefer the term extralogical here because it conveys that these concerns are
customarily considered outside the traditional confines of logical thinking but that the
concerns still are not illogical or nonlogical because they can include logical
propositions.
307. See HUHN, Syllogistic Reasoning, supra note 130, at 818 (noting that "although
judicial reasoning is syllogistic in form, in substance it is evaluative").
308. ALDISERT, supra note 117, at 63 (citing BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 19 (1921)).
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times, however, legal thinkers decide the content of their major pre-
mise based on "value judgments."309
Prior to the Civil War, lawyers and judges who needed to induce
rules based on such judgments drew upon principles of biblical and
natural law.31° After the Civil War, legal theorists "revolt[ed] against
objective concepts of right and wrong."' 311 Many followed the advice of
Oliver Wendell Holmes that "'the true science of the law' lay not in
'logical development as in mathematics' but rather in 'the establish-
ment of its postulates upon accurately measured social desires.' 312
Similarly, Benjamin Cardozo opined that history, "public policy," and
"the good of the collective body" should help legal thinkers determine
the content and the limits of the premises in legal analysis.313
This shift in legal thinking was more of content than of form. In
his summary of the new syllogistic logic of modern legal pragmatism,
John Dewey wrote in 1924:
The problem is not to draw a conclusion from given premises; that can
best be done by a piece of inanimate machinery by fingering a key-
board. The problem is to find statements, of general principle and of
particular fact, which are worthy to serve as premises. As a matter of
actual fact, we generally begin with some vague anticipation of a con-
clusion ... , and then we look around for principles and data which
309. Id. at 64. Selecting this premise is critical because this premise serves as the
filter through which the rules of logic are applied. Id. at 65-66.
310. See Boland, supra note 271, at 249-54 (surveying the reliance of the Founders
and of early courts on the principles of natural law and biblical truth); see also, e.g.,
ALBERT W. ALSHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES 9 (2000) (reasoning that, prior to the Civil
War, those who shaped American jurisprudence founded their theories on natural
law); MCFADDEN, supra note 112, at 174 ("At the time of America's independence from
England, our country's founders were steeped in the traditions of natural law .. ");
HUHN, supra note 2, at 7-8 ("Americans of the Revolutionary era and the early
Nineteenth Century shared a profound faith in the concept of Natural Law, and fought
to establish a government that recognized the 'unalienable rights' of mankind."');
PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 165 (1965) (reporting how Nathaniel
Chipman of Vermont expressed that every law under the Constitution "is ultimately
derived from the laws of nature, and carries with it the force of moral obligation").
311. ALSHULER, supra note 310, at 10, quoted in Boland, supra note 271, at 254-55.
312. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. P-rr. L. REV. 1, 50 (1983)
(quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 225-26 (1920)); see also
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 994 (1997),
reprinted from 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) ("The prophecies of what the "courts will
do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."). On this point,
Boland adds, "For pragmatists, however, consistency with former principles is not the
goal. The goal is the 'social end." Boland, supra note 271, at 286.
313. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 71-72 (1921).
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will substantiate it or which will enable us to choose intelligently
between rival conclusions.3 14
New legal philosophies have emerged since the appearance of
legal pragmatism. 315 However, many current legal reasoning texts con-
tinue to carry forward Dewey's thinking by conjoining emphasis on
logical form with recognition of the extralogical influences on the
law.3 1 6 For instance, in his text Logic for Lawyers that is read by many
law students, Ruggero Aldisert writes:
In exercising this choice [of selecting the syllogism's premises], courts
do not necessarily appeal to any rational or objective criteria. Essen-
tially they exercise a value judgment and should be recognized flatly as
doing so. Moreover, because courts have the power to alter the content
of rules, no immutability attaches to their major or beginning prem-
ises. The desirability of elegantia juris, with its concomitants of stabil-
ity and reckonability, often must be subordinated to the desirability of
rule revision in the light of claims, demands or desires asserted in the
public interest in changing societal conditions. 31 7
314. John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. Q. 17, 21-23 (1924),
quoted in Boland, supra note 271, at 276 (discussing this shifting view of legal
thinking). Benjamin Cardozo similarly represented this change in legal thinking. See
Boland, supra note 271, at 274, 276 (observing how Cardozo called the field of
constitutional law as dominated by the "free decision" in which the "great generalities
of the [C]onstitution have a content and a significance that vary from age to age")
(quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1921)).
315. See MCFADDEN, supra note 112, at 175 (noting the emergence of "critical legal
studies, feminist jurisprudence, critical race studies, and the law as literary text").
316. See, e.g., HUHN, supra note 2, at 10-11 ("[T]he study of law is not a science....
The lawyer's task is not to deduce the law from an unchanging set of first principles,
but rather to predict how the law will emerge from a number of sources and a welter of
conflicting values.").
317. ALDISERT, supra note 117, at 674-65. Aldisert adds that logical principles deal
with "formal correctness" and that reasoning that is logically sound may not be
"desirable" in other respects. Id. at 65. Patrick McFadden describes this change in
American jurisprudence as the "trend" that "the link between law and morality has
been deteriorating since the middle of the Nineteenth Century." McFADDEN, supra
note 112, at 175. In contrast to this overall trend, the last twenty years has witnessed a
renewed emphasis on religious legal education, with the emergence and revitalization
of religiously affiliated law schools. For general discussions on the import of
religiously-affiliated law schools, see Symposium on Religiously Affiliated Law Schools,
78 MARQ. L. REV. 247 (1995); Symposium on Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 11
REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (1998-99); see also Jeffrey A. Brauch, It Sounded Great in the Glossy
Brochure... So Where is It? Carrying Out the Mission at a Mission Driven School, 33 U.
ToL. L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing the issue of implementing a mission at a religiously-
affiliated law school); Randy Lee, Are Religiously Affiliated Law Schools Obsolete in
America? The View of an Outsider Looking in, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 655, 662-63 (2000)
("It has been argued that American legal society has lost the meaning of the religious
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Principles of stare decisis remain primary, and when courts depart
from precedent, they must justify their departure. Nevertheless, courts
today often employ sociopolitical and pragmatic rationales for such
departures. Recent Supreme Court decisions highlight these
rationales.318
These changes in legal philosophy lead to the question of whether
thinking like a lawyer generally has changed from concentrating on
applying accepted, fundamental rules to encompassing more readily a
challenge to whether the rules should serve as rules in the first
place.31 9 Lawyers today make arguments before courts and other par-
ties in which they contend that the courts should adopt a rule of law
that does not directly emanate from a statute, the Constitution, or pre-
vious caselaw. Legal educators similarly contend that law students
concepts that make justice possible: concepts like forgiveness, redemption, love as
sharing . . . , and even community. Religiously affiliated law schools are uniquely
situated to teach their students to reinvigorate the law with these concepts.").
318. For instance, see Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992), where the Court reasoned:
Even when the decision to overrule a prior case is not, as in the rare, latter
instance, virtually foreordained, it is common wisdom that the rule of stare
decisis is not an "inexorable command," and certainly it is not such in every
constitutional case. .. . Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior holding,
its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision
with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of
reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for example, we may ask
whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the
cost of repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far .developed
as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or
whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
Id. at 854 (citations omitted), quoted in SAVELLOS & GALVIN, supra note 214, at 70; see
also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (overturning a prior decision to hold that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit execution of individuals who were
under eighteen years of age at time of their capital crimes); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling a prior decision to hold that it was unconstitutional for a
Texas statute to make it a crime for two individuals of the same sex to engage in
certain intimate sexual conduct).
319. Cf. Boland, supra note 271, at 292 (reasoning that modern pragmatic
jurisprudence employs sociological considerations, which "which work their way
backwards to a major premise that is forever changing depending on the desired and
pre-ordained outcome").
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should learn not just the rules of law but "how to persuasively argue
for a favorable interpretation of the law or for a change in the law."
320
The rise of this type of argument, however, has not fundamentally
changed the cognitive components of legal thinking. As noted, the
robustness of the syllogistic form in the face of this dramatic shift in
legal thinking underscores the centrality of logical thinking to "think-
ing like a lawyer. "321 Moreover, the fact that lawyers are considering
more than the civil law in making their arguments is not a new cogni-
tive construct. Lawyers have always looked beyond the civil law to
inform their understanding of the law.322 Throughout history lawyers
have looked to biblical precepts and principles of natural law; and
today, lawyers are also looking to psychological, sociological, sociopo-
litical, and a host of other types of concerns.323
Reflection on such issues underscores that legal thinkers today, as
they have at other times in history, must be able to consider the logical
extension of a particular position. In solving legal problems, legal
thinkers must identify the ramifications of a particular position they
take and consider whether that position will lead to absurd or immoral
results. The expression "bad facts make bad law" is relevant here.
Lawyers must recognize how judges are concerned with setting bad
320. HUHN, supra note 2, at 11.
321. In fact, Aldisert affirms that the logical form is central to legal thinking.
ALDISERT, supra note 117, at 67 ("Once the controlling rule or principle has been
selected or modified . . . we must use canons of logic to reach a formally correct
conclusion.") (emphasis added) (citing JOHN DEWEY, How WE THINK 20 (1933)).
Some critics, however, challenge that the maintenance of the syllogistic form is
contrived. For instance, James Boland calls modern-day legal reasoning "principled
illegitimacy" when such reasoning begins with "pre-ordained" certain conclusions,
which are then artificially supported by their premises. Boland, supra note 271, at
291-92.
322. This contention does not mean that all sources, from natural law to sociology,
are equally valid sources for jurisprudential insight. It merely means that considering
such sources does not involve qualitatively different cognitive processes.
323. Identifying an exhaustive list of such concerns is problematic. As Robert
Vischer observes, "Increasingly, the [legal] profession itself seems ... properly viewed
as a host of competing and contrasting subcommunities .. " Vischer, supra note 284,
at 432. These communities undoubtedly have different "big" considerations they
emphasize in arguing beyond black-letter law principles for changes in the law. See id.
at 430-33 (describing the rise of the "religious lawyering movement" as challenging the
notion that lawyers should not make arguments based on moral or religious grounds)
(quoting Russell G. Pearce, Foreword: The Religious Lawyering Movement: An Emerging
Force in Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998)).
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precedent 324 and thus must understand how an argument in the pre-
sent context would apply in other, reasonably foreseeable contexts.
Lawyers must also understand how their role as officers of the court
affects their ability to advance certain arguments. In arriving at their
major premises, they must comply with their ethical responsibili-
ties.3 2 5 The law students in the Regent survey therefore had it right;
legal analysis involves more than simply analysis of law. 326 Thus, the
problem solving framework in the Appendix recognizes that extralogi-
cal concerns inform the legal thinking process.
VII. CONCLUSION
The trend in recent years has been to expand the conception of
what it means to "think like a lawyer" to include non-cognitive skills
that pertain more to "lawyering" generally than to the cognitive
processes involved in legal thinking. 327 Although these non-cognitive,
practical skills may be central to the task of lawyering, they should not
be confused with the cognitive components that are fundamental to
legal thinking and remain the philosophical backbone of legal
education.328
In systematic fashion, this article has therefore sought to identify
specific, albeit sometimes overlapping, cognitive components of legal
324. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Kirby Inland Marine, L.P., 365 F.Supp.2d 777, 782
(M.D. La. 2005) (demonstrating a court's concern that a particular holding would "set
a bad precedent").
325. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) ("A lawyer shall not
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law."); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2003) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose to
the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be
directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel
. . . . .).
326. In this vein, Patrick McFadden contends that one of the four qualities of a good
legal argument is "truth." He argues that lawyers "always, ultimately, seek the truth in
law or else the whole enterprise loses its value and moral foundation." McFADDEN,
supra note 112, at 170. It should be noted, however, that the legal system does not
ensure true or fair results. Cf. NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION 393-94 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing how the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not require that lawyers be "fair" or
disclose all facts in dealing with other participants to a negotiation).
327. See ButleRitchie, supra note 2, at 30-31.
328. Cf. id. at 29-31 ("The notion that a legal education is meant to convey to
students an idea of how to 'think like lawyers' is central to the modern legal
academy."); supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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thinking. As visualized by the Appendix, the article presents legal
analysis in the overall framework of problem solving. Certain cogni-
tive components, such as linear thinking, searching for coherence,
crafting arguments, and attending to detail, permeate various stages of
the framework. In the problem identification phrase, cognitive skills
such as assessing relevance rise in importance. In the movement
towards problem solution, skills such as perceiving ambiguity, dissect-
ing thought, and seeing others' perspectives become applicable. All
these skills are informed by the overall logical structure of legal think-
ing generally. Finally, this framework is supplemented by extralogical
considerations, such as morality, ethics, and public policy, which situ-
ate legal thinkers in the context of a professional community and a
worldview structure.
Discussing this prototypical framework of legal thinking implies
that individuals must follow this form of thinking to succeed as law-
yers. Even if "success" could be defined in this context, the implication
would not be true. Recent research demonstrates that nontraditional
legal thinkers can do well on the LSAT and in law school; 3 29 "success"
based on those criteria is not predetermined from a particular cogni-
tive structure.
Nevertheless, that same research confirms that legal thinkers tend
to follow certain cognitive styles.330 The inference appears undeniable
that there is some substantive import to the phrase "thinking like a
lawyer." Although precise definitions of the phrase vary, the enor-
mous overlap in lawyer surveys, law student surveys, LSAT and bar
examination materials, and pertinent legal literature demonstrates that
certain core attributes define legal thinking. Moreover, this overlap
has persisted in the face of recent changes in legal education and law
practice.33 1
Armed with an understanding of these core attributes, legal edu-
cators can better train their students in the skill they deem so funda-
mental. More specifically, academic support professionals can provide
their students with an overall framework that serves as the backdrop
329. See DeGroff & McKee, supra note 3, at 523-31, 546 (reflecting in their results
that the correlation between law students' learning styles and LSAT scores and first-
year GPAs was not perfect).
330. See id. (nevertheless finding positive correlations between students' learning
styles and their LSAT scores and first-year GPAs).
331. Cf. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 8 (noting that there is no "gap"
between instruction in legal education and the needs of law practitioners).
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for the specific study techniques they provide to students.332 Aca-
demic support in law schools has generated renewed interest in the
educational theory behind legal instruction.333 Scrutinizing legal edu-
cation's core goal to produce good legal thinkers can only advance that
interest.
332. Cf. STROPUS & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 13 & 16 n.28 (devoting little
discussion to defining "thinking like a lawyer" and focusing rather on specific study
techniques important to law school success).
333. For instance, at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, the Academic Support Section sponsored a session on "Exploring the
Scholarship of Teaching and Learning." The session, which was held on January 5,
2004, featured new developments in research relating to academic support
instructional programs.
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APPENDIX
COGNITIVE STEPS IN THINKING LIKE A LAWYER
Legal Problem Arises(e.g., tearm problem from client interview)
Determine Type
of Legal Problem
(e.g., assess client needs and desires;
involves searching for coherence)
r Discern Relevant Facts I
Find Applicable Rule(s)
(inductive reasoning in finding
major premise for categorical syllogism)
Find applicable statute
(inductive analogical reasoning may
be needed to determine applicability)
Synthesize rule(s)
(inductive generalization may be
needed to combine rules
from multiple civil law sources)
Apply Rule
(deductive reasonin
premise to minor p
chiefly involved: dis
perceiving
Determine Fa
Relevant to Rule
(inductive reasoning)
(s) to Facts synthesize rule(s)
g in applying major (inductive generalization needed
remise; other skills if no clear and applicable
recting thought and rule statement from cases)
ambiguity)
Consider Arguments and
Counter-Arguments
for Rule Applicability-
compare and contrast problem with analogous cases
(skills chiefly involved: attending to detail,
being objective (seeing all sides))
+
Consider Extralogical Factors
(such as morality, ethics, and public policy)
Reach Conclusion
(Solve Problem)
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